Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation by Chu, Ke-young
 
Copyright © UNU-WIDER 2004 
* School of Economics and International Trade, Kyung Hee University, Seoul Korea; email: 
kchu@khu.ac.kr  
This study has been prepared within the UNU-WIDER Sabbatical and Visiting Fellows programme, and 
is published in the project on New Directions in Development Economics. 
UNU-WIDER acknowledges the financial contributions to the research programme by the governments 
of Denmark (Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Finland (Ministry for Foreign Affairs), Norway (Royal 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Sweden (Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency—Sida) 
and the United Kingdom (Department for International Development). 
ISSN 1810-2611 ISBN 92-9190-663-8 (internet version) 
Research Paper No. 2004/66 





This paper uses a game-theoretic framework to explain how collectivist values hamper 
societies’ efforts to elicit cooperation in inter-group games of prisoners’ dilemma (PD) and 
draws on the results of the analysis to interpret the meanings of three historical institutional 
reform episodes. Group-oriented values, widespread throughout non-western civilizations, 
can contribute to social cohesion, but tend to cause inter-group conflicts within a country. 
Regional, ethnic, and other internally cohesive groups often cannot get out of defection 
traps in political and economic PD games they play with each other. Repeating to play the 
games enhances chances for, but does not assure, cooperation between these groups. 
Factionalism makes it more difficult for group-oriented societies, compared with 
individualist ones, to achieve inter-group cooperation. History shows, however, that some 
societies have tamed factionalism by reforming their institutions. The institutional reforms 
in ancient Athens, colonial America, and Singapore show that hybrid political groups, or 
institutionally-engineered political siblings, which drew their members from rival groups, 
sought broader social interests than the ethnic or other pre-reform special-interest groups 
had done, thus, helping the societies achieve Paretian improvements. Indirect democracy in 
which the representatives of the hybrid political groups were key game players in political 
processes reduced chances for special-interest groups to form powerful factional coalitions. 
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One of the under-researched topics in economics, particularly in its analysis of 
institutions, is what collectivism and individualism—two different systems of cultural 
values—imply for the operation and development of a country’s political and economic 
institutions. The operation and development of these institutions have far-reaching 
implications for the operation and development of an economy.  
Economic theory, in general, assumes rational, individualist agents seeking self-interest. 
Research by Hofstede and by cross-cultural and social psychologists suggests, however, 
that culturally collectivist societies, by comparison with individualist societies, tend to 
value achieving group objectives more than achieving individual objectives.1 These 
societies tend to have a large ‘power distance’, in Hofstede’s (1997) terminology, and, 
thus, tend to tolerate their leaders’ forceful, paternalistic, and authoritarian use of power. 
The groups in this paper may be called cultural groups, which emerge as a result of 
prolonged social interactions, with or without blood ties. These groups are not 
necessarily those, such as discussed by Olson (1965), formed to seek collective net 
material gains, nor are they necessarily groups with blood-ties.2 In a collectivist society, 
members of a group formed purely on account of shared material interests may acquire 
features of a cohesive cultural group, as its members expand and deepen their 
interactions. While an obvious factor that binds members of a group is blood-ties, 
people may acquire group-oriented values through parental upbringing, peer pressure, 
and formal education—processes that may broadly be called ‘enculturation’, in 
psychologists’ term.3 
Inter-group rivalry obviously is pronounced in a country where different ethnic groups 
compete for dominance as a result of an artificial national border drawn by a former 
colonial power. The phenomenon of group-oriented social interactions and inter-group 
conflicts are strong, however, even in collectivist countries (e.g., Korea) without ethnic 
division. Individuals belong to a variety of overlapping groups, to which they have 
different degrees of loyalty. 
Examples of a group in this paper include, in addition to an ethnic group, residents in a 
region, or a regionally-based political party with intra-group cultural ties. Members of a 
group of this nature rarely change their membership, although, over time, economic and 
social changes (e.g., inter-regional migration) can alter the characteristics of such 
groups (e.g., a group of residents in a region that has a long value-sharing history).  
                                                                                                 
1  See Hofstede (1997, 2001); Berry et al. (1992), and Triandis et al. (1986, 1988). 
2  Groups with blood-ties are obviously internally cohesive. Thus, when The Congo held the first 
election after independence, virtually all of the 120 political parties formed were aimed at promoting 
tribal interests. Many tribal groups have been in severe inter-group conflicts. Reader (1997) notes: 
‘Tribalism  …  has a distinctly dark and nasty African connotation: the Maasai and the Kikuyu in 
Kenya; the Zulu and the Xhosa in South Africa; the Yoruba, Hausa, and Igbo in Nigeria; the Hutu and 
the Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi. These and other groups have at times seemed determined to 
eliminate each other simply because they claimed differences of birthright’. There are evidences, 
however, indicating that in Africa pre-colonial inter-tribal distinctions were not always sharp and 
clear. 
3 See  Berry et al. (1992: 17-41).  
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As shown in cross-country analysis in social psychology, ethnic groups in collectivist 
societies tend to be cohesive, more so than individualist societies. Groups of residents in 
separate regions in collectivist societies have shown tendencies of intra-group cohesion 
and inter-group rivalry. With a strong leader, a political party in a collectivist society 
often displays a high degree of intra-group cohesion and inter-group rivalry. These are 
not groups that form and dissolve easily as a result of short-run ups and downs of net 
benefits for their members.  
While this tendency of inter-group conflicts may also exist in individualist societies, it 
tends to be more pronounced in collectivist societies. How these groups emerge is an 
important issue, which this paper does not attempt to analyse. The paper’s point of 
departure is a recognition that, as empirically supported, such cohesive value-sharing 
groups exist, either as a result of blood and other ties.4 Ethnic and other groups in 
individualist societies may have intra-group cohesion, but the degree of their intra-group 
cohesion is lower than in collectivist societies. Their cohesiveness and inter-group 
rivalry fluctuate as a result of changes in socioeconomic and political situations and are 
not as enduring as in collectivist societies.5 
Collectivist societies characterized by a large power distance have certain strengths. 
They tend to value cooperation among members of a group. It may be relatively easy for 
a collectivist society to achieve consensus on certain issues in certain circumstances, 
for example, when its groups face a common external threat.6 The acceptance of an 
unequal distribution of power, in principle, may allow forceful and wise authoritarian 
leaders to take decisive actions aimed at avoiding destructive social interactions. 
Apart from these positive features, however, research in cross-cultural psychology 
suggests that culturally collectivist societies tend to experience (i) severe factionalism 
and inter-group conflicts and (ii) a high degree of discretion in rule enforcement, much 
more so than in individualist societies. Collectivist societies, in general, have developed 
a rule of man, while individualist societies have developed a rule of law. Both 
collectivist and individualist societies have rival groups, but inter-group conflicts in the 
former tend to be more intense than in the latter, where (i) individualist values tend to 
limit both intra-group cohesion and inter-group conflicts7  and (ii) well-established 
formal third-party rules (e.g., constitutions and other laws) tend to limit destructive 
social interactions (see section 2).8 
                                                                                                 
4  Groups can have a variety of internal governance structure. Inter-group conflicts could be intensified 
by horizontal income inequality. See Addison (2001), Agarwal (2000) and Stewart (2001) for 
discussions of groups and inter-group conflicts and Heyer, Stewart and Thorp (1999) for a discussion 
of various types of internal governance of groups.  
5  See Aronson, Wilson and Akert (2002) for a discussion of ups and downs of inter-ethnic rivalry in the 
United States, as a function of socioeconomic conditions. 
6  At an early phase of the Korean financial crisis in 1997-98, group-oriented Koreans demonstrated a 
remarkable sense of unity and a willingness to endure individual financial hardship to promote an 
early recovery of the Korean economy. In general, however, Korea, an ethnically homogenous society, 
suffers from factionalism.  
7  How individualism, by comparison with collectivism, subdues inter-group conflicts will be shown 
later. 
8  That individualist societies rely on a rule of law is among Hofstede’s major points.  
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Both  inter-group conflicts and discretionary rule enforcement hamper collectivist 
countries’ pursuit of rules-based political and economic interactions and economic 
development. Rival groups, by trying to promote their factional interests, suffer from 
diminished chances to promote encompassing interests, undermining, as a result, their 
own interests. Without effectively enforced rules to guide their transactions, they suffer 
from this standard Pareto-inefficient outcome for prisoners’ dilemma (PD) games, 
which characterize many economic and political reforms and other interactions between 
rival interest groups (see the following section). The analysis of inter-group conflicts 
suggests that rival groups in these societies have limited chances to build up efficient 
rules on their own, giving rise to pessimism with regard to the prospect for their 
escaping defection traps to enjoy Paretian improvements on an economy-wide scale. 
This pessimism concerning these collectivist societies is in contrast with optimistic 
results based on a range of economic models, including game theoretic ones, that 
suggest tendencies for societies to achieve evolutionary progress.9 
The discretionary enforcement of criminal justice, tax laws, and regulatory regimes can 
make the enforcement of rules in collectivist societies unpredictable. This discourages 
productive long-term investments. 
Social psychologists’ cross-country analyses of human behavioural norms are insightful. 
Drawing on surveys and empirical observations, however, their findings are not based 
on formal models that postulate causal relations between key variables. Use of such 
models would enrich the understanding and discussion of the analytical results.10  
This paper uses a game-theoretic framework to analyse the nature of inter-group 
conflicts in collectivist societies and to interpret historical reforms aimed at achieving 
productive social and political interactions, thus shedding light on how to promote 
political and economic reforms in group-oriented societies. The framework of the 
analysis, which is compatible with the evolutionary game-theoretic framework, aims to 
place the former in a much shorter timespan than in the latter and, thus, to offer concrete 
suggestions for an institutional reform that swims with, not against, evolutionary tides. 
An analysis of the problem of discretion will be left for a separate paper.11 
                                                                                                 
9  Notwithstanding the pessimistic outcome arising from a one-off PD game and without mentioning the 
neoclassical analytical outcomes, one can point to many analytical bases for optimism for productive 
human cooperation. For example, Axelrod (1984) seems to consider the conditions for cooperation 
less stringent than is characterized later in this paper. He notes: ‘The foundation of cooperation is not 
really trust, but the durability of the relationship’ . Hirshleifer (2001) points to a number of roads to 
cooperation. Evolutionary game models relying on broader human motivations suggest a variety of 
optimistic roads to cooperation. This optimism, certainly in line with the prosperity in developed 
economies, is not compatible with widespread poverty and world-wide under-achievement of the 
human potential. Moreover, the optimism that rises from evolutionary game models is somewhat 
deceptive, since these studies compress the long, sweeping evolutionary processes that have taken 
scores of thousands of years into one computer simulation. 
10 An extensive field work, including some mentioned later in this paper, using game-theoretic and other 
models has been conducted and is still being conducted with the samples in locations around the 
world. 
11 See Chu (2004). This paper expands on the results reported in Chu (2003), which has some discussion 
of the implications of inter-group conflicts and discretionary rule enforcement for institutional 
development in collectivist societies.  
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Section 2 provides an overview of the implications of culture for behavioural norms. 
Group orientation engenders interdependent individuals, giving rise to behavioural 
norms and other rules quite different from those in individualist societies.  
Section 3 introduces a game-theoretic model of inter-group conflicts and alternative 
rules that can promote cooperation between rival groups. In the context of models 
dealing with insider-outsider games, this section shows why it is difficult for two rival 
groups with collectivist values to cooperate voluntarily with each other even when a 
game is infinitely repeated. Both individuals and groups in societies face many PD 
games. Inability for individuals and groups to achieve cooperation has negative social 
consequences. Inability for groups to achieve cooperation is of special institutional 
significance—for example, in developing efficient rules of the game and pursuing sound 
policies. The section presents a model showing that collectivist societies face a greater 
challenge than individualist societies because collectivist values may have internally 
cohesive rival groups perceive non-PD games, which would yield cooperation, as PD 
games, which yield defection. While these tendencies give rise to the need for effective 
third-party rules, collectivist societies tend to have ineffective third-party rules.12 The 
section suggests, therefore, that forming hybrid groups, drawing their members from 
rival groups, will increase chances for the groups to move out of defection traps without 
having to establish a third-party rule. 
Section 4 uses the framework of this model to analyse a number of practical problems. 
The section shows that, while not easy, forming hybrid groups is feasible and politically 
more realistic to achieve than a third-party rule, which is perhaps an end-point of 
institutional evolution and, therefore, should be a longer-term goal of a developing 
society. A third-party rule emerges from cooperative games, whereas, as will be shown 
later, games between hybrid groups resemble noncooperative games and require less 
third-party coordination, which is difficult to obtain in collectivist societies. In ancient 
Greece, colonial America, and Singapore, institutional reforms along these lines, in 
which institutional entrepreneurs—Cleisthenes, James Madison, and Lee Kuan Yew—
played key roles, tamed inter-group conflicts.  
Section 5 outlines a broader framework that may be used to explain how collectivist 
societies work both in static and dynamic contexts. This section interprets the rise of 
institutional entrepreneurs in an evolutionary game framework. Section 6 concludes the 
discussion. 
2  Cultural values and social interactions 
2.1  Dimensions of culture 
Hofstede (1997, 2001) offers a broad, although not formal, framework of analysis of 
human behavioural norms by reducing culture to quantifiable dimensions. In the context 
of this framework, human mental programming is unique at three levels: (i) human 
nature, (ii) culture, and (iii) personality. Human nature, which distinguishes human 
                                                                                                 
12 Collectivist societies tend to have a strong rule of man, but may not maintain effective third-party 
rules.  
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beings from other animals, is universal and inherited. Culture is group-specific and is 
learned. Personality is individual-specific and is both learned and inherited. 
Culture, as defined by Hofstede, has four dimensions: (i) collectivism and individualism, 
(ii) large and small power distance, (iii) strong and weak uncertainty avoidance, and (iv) 
masculinity and femininity. This paper focuses only on the first two dimensions of 
culture as a means of analysing inter-group conflicts and their implications for 
institutional development. 
2.2 Behavioural  implications  of cultural collectivism 
Collectivism and individualism define one of the four dimensions of culture and 
represent two different value systems that lead to contrasting behavioural norms. 
Different societies can have different degrees of collectivism. A large or a small power 
distance defines culture’s another dimension. Societies with a large power distance tend 
to tolerate and accept an unequal distribution of power and authoritarian rule for their 
groups. Although there are exceptions, individualist societies, in general, tend to have a 
small power distance; collectivist societies, a large power distance.13 
The empirical studies of cross-cultural psychologists offer a rich analysis of behavioural 
implications of these values. Thus, a collectivist society with a large power distance, in 
comparison with an individualist society that has a small power distance, tends to have 
several distinct characteristics: 
a)  Members of a collectivist society value achieving group interests more than 
achieving individual interests. An individual is often identified more as a group 
member than as an individual.14  By contrast, individualism tends to value 
members of society more as individuals than as group members. Does group-
orientation mean that individuals in a collectivist society do not pursue their 
self-interests? Cross-cultural psychologists note that shared group-oriented 
values tend to limit their pursuit of self-interests. Individuals in a collectivist 
society may have different individual  values. On average, their degree of 
collectivist tendencies is higher than that of those in individualist societies. 
b)  Members of a group are loyal to one another and value harmony and cohesion 
among members of a group. Interpersonal relations are often more important 
than rules. Individuals, however, tend to have conflictive interactions with the 
members of other groups. Groups, therefore, tend to have strong inter-group 
conflicts. Different collectivist societies may have different degrees of inter-
group conflicts. By contrast, individuals in individualist societies are less loyal 
                                                                                                 
13  Recent research in cross-cultural psychology distinguishes between horizontal and vertical 
individualism and collectivism (HI vs. VI and HC vs. VC). A horizontal/vertical society, whether 
individualist or collectivist, tends to have a small/large power distance. A vertical society tends to 
accept inequality more easily than a horizontal society does. Among individualist societies, the United 
States is a VI society; Northern European countries HI societies. Within collectivist societies, there are 
HC communities, in which members do not have any sense of hierarchy, as well as VC societies, in 
which privileged leaders have social obligations to safeguard the livelihoods of subordinates (see, for 
example, Darwish and Huber 2003). 
14 See Feldman (2001: 475-7), as well as Hofstede (1997).   
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to the groups they belong to, and groups tend to have less inter-group conflicts. 
In principle, a collectivist nation could achieve strong national cohesion with 
no conflict among groups within the nation. In practice, however, inter-group 
conflicts are strong within a collectivist society.  
c)  Members of a group experience shame when they have trespassed proper 
limits for socially acceptable behaviour. This feature compares with the 
emotion of guilt in individualist societies. Shame is a group-oriented emotion; 
guilt is an individual-oriented emotion (see Benedict 1946 for a discussion of 
this phenomenon with respect to Japan). 
d)  Ideal leaders are authoritarian, paternalistic autocrats. By contrast, ideal leaders 
in individualist societies are resourceful democrats. 
e)  They tend to value a rule of man and discretionary enforcement of rules. By 
contrast, individualist societies tend to value a rule of law and rules-based 
social interactions.15  Collectivist societies within which rule enforcers with 
paternalist ideals use a high degree of discretion in enforcing rules often 
experience unintended consequences of reduced transparency and 
predictability of rules. 
The essential difference between the two contrasting value systems is well captured in 
the following two passages: 
Each member of society is thought to have an inviolability founded on 
justice… which even the welfare of every one else cannot 
override… Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right 
by a greatest good shared by others (Rawls 1999: 24-25). 
Nation before [ethnic] community and society above self… Consensus 
instead of contention… (Government of Singapore, quoted in Huntington 
1996: 319). 
Key features of ideal governance in the two worlds are captured in the following 
passages delineating two contrasting ideals: 
It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to adjust these 
clashing interests, and render them all subservient to the public goods. 
Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm (Madison 1788). 
 
Confucianism traced back the ordering of a national life to the regulation 
of the family life and the regulation of the family life to the cultivation of 
the personal life (Lin 1938: 21). 
 
 
                                                                                                 
15 In one of the few economists’ studies of the implications of individualism vs. collectivism, Greif 
(1994) has also noted that individualist societies have developed rules-based transactions, while 
collectivist societies have developed transactions based on personal ties.  
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Table 1 
 Dimensions of culture and effectiveness of rules 
 
Dimensions of culture 
 Effectiveness  of 
rules 





(1) (2)    (3) 
Standard deviation    25.6  26.0    1.1 
West 20-22  70  37    6.2 
Rest of the world  21-25  25  72    4.0 
Notes:   Column (1) shows measures of the index of individualism-collectivism (a measure close to 100 
means a high degree of individualism), column (2) measures of power distance (a measure close 
to 100 means a high degree of power distance); and column (3) measures of the degree of rule 
of law (a higher index means a higher degree of rule of law. The individualism-collectivism and 
power distance indices, respectively, range from 92 and 40 (United States), 89 and 35 (United 
Kingdom), and 74 and 16 (Sweden) to 12 and 81 (Venezuela), 17 and 58 (Taiwan), and 18 and 
60 (Korea).  
Sources:  Chu (2003). The results are based on the data from Hofstede (1997) and World Economic 
Forum (2001).  
 
In the former, Madison underscores the importance of not presuming that enlightened 
statesmen will always be governing. Therefore, a government based on rules should 
replace a government by enlightened statesmen ruling with discretion. The latter 
highlights the important role Confucianism attaches to cultivated leaders, who would be 
able to use their discretion for public interests, rather than for personal gains.16 
Table 1 provides an overview of individualism-collectivism indices for two groups of 
countries and some individual countries. 
A regression of a rule of law (RL) index on an individualism-collectivism (IC) index 
yields the following equation, confirming a strong correlation between individualism 
and a rule of law.17 
RL =    3.659     +  0.034IC     Adjusted R2 = 0.581 
 (15.22)  (7.60) 
3  A model of inter-group conflicts and cooperation 
This section analyses how two internally cohesive rival groups in a collectivist society 
may interact with each other in strategic games. Members of a collectivist society 
belong to a number of overlapping formal and informal groups: for example, a labour 
union, a group of residents of a certain region, a political party, an extended family, and 
                                                                                                 
16 Hofstede notes that this tendency to value ideal leaders, rather than rules and checks and balances, is 
shared by collectivist societies beyond the Confucian world. 
17 See Chu (2003). The rule of law index is the unweighted average of three indices (judicial 
independence, soundness of property rights, and predictability of rules), based on opinion surveys and 
reported in WEF (2001). The individualism-collectivism index is from Hofstede (1997).  
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a class of a university. Their degrees of loyalty differ between groups and through time. 
Their loyalty is more enduring with some groups than with others. 
This section explores possible roads to inducing cooperative behaviour in inter-group 
conflicts of enduring nature. The analysis starts with the assumption that each group has 
coherent, not necessarily formal, decision rules for transforming individual interests to 
group interest. It also assumes that each group has its system of distributing the group’s 
payoffs. The simplest case of governance would be a benevolent autocracy in which an 
authoritarian leader coordinates group members’ activities. The paper later discusses 
different decision rules. 
3.1  A brief review of literature in inter-group conflicts 
There are a large number of studies in groups in economics, political science, sociology, 
and social psychology. This review focuses on those in game theory, which offers rich 
tools to analyse inter-group conflicts. Classical game theory suggests that rational 
individualists, or groups of them, seeking self interest, while unable to achieve 
cooperation in typical one-off games of prisoners’ dilemma (PD), enhance their chances 
for cooperation when they repeat PD games, with an appropriate discount rate and an 
effective punishment strategy, such as a tif-for-tat (TfT) or a trigger strategy.18  
Drawing on real-life observations and one-off experimental games that show human 
tendencies of not behaving as classical game models predict, game theorists have used 
simulations to show that certain aspects of the institutional evolution in human societies 
may be modelled and explained by assuming altruism, fairness, group orientation, and 
strong reciprocity. In the context of an effort to explain the behaviour of inter-group 
conflicts in collectivist societies, three strands of research are notable: 
a)  In one of such strands, game models distinguish between (material) payoffs 
and players’ perceptions of these payoffs.19 Game theorists have explored the 
implications of inter-player interdependence for game outcomes. In the studies 
of Konrad (2002), Ahn et al. (2001), Engelmann and Strobel (2000), Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), players choose their strategies on the basis of pecuniary (i.e., 
material) payoffs, but are influenced by their opponent’s payoffs, not only their 
own, but also their opponent’s relative payoff positions, as well as by their 
collective gains. 
b)  Recognizing such interdependence gives rise to possibilities of modelling how 
individuals might have different attitudes toward insiders and outsiders. Game 
models have used insider-outsider relations to show the slow emergence of 
cultural groups. Bowles and Hopfensitz (2000) have used an evolutionary 
game model to show how group-oriented human traits and resource-sharing 
institutions may have evolved jointly through genetic and cultural 
                                                                                                 
18 Axelrod’s experiments (1984) have shown enhanced chances for cooperation based on a TfT, while 
the standard game models have shown how two rational players can achieve cooperation by repeating 
a PD game with a trigger strategy. 
19 The tradition of analysing games on the basis of players’ utilities goes back to von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1944).  
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transmissions. Humans emerging through these evolutionary processes are 
group-oriented—altruistic toward insiders and antagonistic toward outsiders. 
Another important related finding of insider-outsider models is the plausibility 
of the emergence of strong reciprocators, who are willing to suffer pains to 
reward other reciprocators and punish defectors. Gintis (2000) discusses an 
insider-outsider model, in which discriminators (the homo parochius), playing 
a game of the tragedy of the commons, attach a positive weight to the payoffs 
of fellow discriminators and a negative weight to those of selfish outsiders.  
c)  Whereas these are evolutionary models, which explain changes in human 
behaviour and institutions over scores of thousands of years or longer, another 
strand of research has explored how groups may form in a static framework. 
Olson (1965) has discussed groups in pursuits of net benefits from group 
membership. Muenster (2004) builds a model that shows how intra-group and 
inter-group conflicts are jointly determined as rent-seeking opportunities arise 
from contractual incompleteness. In Muenster’s model, the degree of inter-
group and intra-group contests and group cohesion are interdependent. An 
increase in rent-seeking opportunities in inter-group transactions would lead 
group members to be more conflictive toward outsiders, while strengthening 
intra-group solidarity. 
3.2  An overview of an analytical framework 
This paper draws on these results to analyse inter-group conflicts in collectivist societies, 
how and why the conflicts do not subside, and what institutions might help them 
achieve mutual cooperation. 
The groups in this paper are internally cohesive value-sharing groups in collectivist 
societies. Unlike those in Muenster, the groups in this paper are enduring ones. Unlike 
in Bowles and Hopfensitz (2000) and Bowles and Gintis (2003), time in this paper is far 
too brief to allow evolutionary changes in institutions, but is sufficiently long to 
accommodate significant institutional reforms. This characterization of what can change 
and what not and what is feasible and what not in this paper requires some elaboration. 
In this paper, two internally cohesive groups cannot easily achieve cooperation in a PD 
game, even if they repeat the play, not only because its material payoffs have a PD 
structure, but also each group chooses its strategies on the basis of perceived payoffs, 
which it calculates as weighted averages of its own and its opponents’ material payoffs, 
with λ and 1- λ as the weights, as explained in section3.2. With λ, a cultural parameter, 
in excess of 1, a group’s perceived payoffs are negative functions of the opponent’s 
positive material payoffs. For a given set of material payoffs, the model shows the 
attainability of cooperation on a λ-i plane as a negative function of both λ, the weight, 
and i, the discount rate (see below).  
The model is flexible to show how the value of λ reinforces or offsets the positive effect 
of repetition on tendencies for players to cooperate. This result, while confirming 
tendencies for gene-sharing biological siblings to cooperate (with λ < 1), highlights the 
nature of the problems in collectivist societies, where two factors keep the groups in a 
defection trap: (1) a high discount rate, reflecting inadequate third-party rules and a high 
degree of uncertainties reflecting a high degree of discretion in rule enforcement, and  
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(2) a large λ exceeding 1, or a negative weight attached for the opponent’s payoffs, 
reflecting severe inter-group rivalry. 
In this framework, the paper characterizes successful institutional reform efforts in 
ancient Greece, colonial America, and Singapore, as the emergence of institutionally 
engineered political siblings. The emergence of these political siblings was in line with 
evolutionary game models, in which strong reciprocators play a key role in disciplining 
game-playing groups to alter their tendencies to defect. These evolutionary game 
models, however, while providing a broad framework to predict the emergence of both 
strong reciprocators and institutions for cooperation, are excessively long-run-oriented 
to be useful to explain the birth of political siblings. The framework in this paper fills 
the gap in evolutionary game models to provide details to the picture of evolutionary 
processes painted by the models. 
This paper highlights the role of institutional entrepreneurs as early strong reciprocators. 
The gains associated with a Pareto-efficient move from mutual defection (D-D) to 
mutual cooperation (C-C) offer incentives for a society in conflict. They prepare a 
ground for the birth of political siblings. Game-playing groups, however, would not 
voluntarily make the move, without the role of these early strong reciprocators as 
catalysts. This paper notes that the emergence of early strong reciprocators depended on 
the frequency distribution of individual traits that defined institutional entrepreneurs. 
These traits would include not only cognitive ability to recognize an opportunity, but 
also other leadership qualities, such as intelligence and motivation. Those societies that 
had such individuals succeeded in establishing new institutions that allowed cooperation 
between political siblings; those that had no such individuals have not been able to 
implement such a reform. 
3.3 Collectivist  values,  inter-group  conflicts, and failure to cooperate 
The games discussed in this paper are two varieties of the games of complete 
information: (i) one-off games and (ii) infinitely repeated games, in which game players 
experience cross-player utility spillover. To model this phenomenon, this paper uses a 
simple 2x2 game, in which players form their respective perceived payoffs by 
calculating weighted averages of material payoffs, with λ and (1- λ) as the weights, the 
former for self and the latter for the opponent. The game-playing group i uses λij for this 
calculation to play games with an opponent j. This weight may be considered an 
weighted average of λij’s that the individuals who belong to the group i use when they 
play games individually with members of the group j. (In subsequent discussions, the 
subscripts i and j will be dropped when the discussion clearly concerns games between 
two individuals or groups.) 
In this paper, the payoff values of a, b, c, d, and the cultural parameters λij’s (to be 
elaborated below) are common knowledge among all game-playing groups.  The 
uncertainties (about the future) enter the model in this paper only in the form of a high 
discount rate i in the case of repeated games. 
To develop the model, consider the following symmetric material payoffs for a game 
between two groups:  
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Material payoffs, an example of which is shown in Matrix (1), are the payoffs that can 
be measured objectively (e.g., number of national assembly seats, financial gains) and 
are compared with perceived payoffs, as illustrated in Matrix (2).  
Matrix (1) 
Material payoffs 
 Group  Y 
 cooperation  defection 
Group X    
cooperation  a, a  b, c 
defection  c, b  d, d 
 
Consider the following two different cases: 
Case 1a 
In case (1a), for which the payoff matrix is shown in Matrix (1a), the game is a 
prisoners’ dilemma (PD). The dominant strategy in a one-off game is ‘defection’ for 
either of the players. In this case, the payoffs may be ordered as:  c > a > d > b, where, 
for example, c = 15, a = 10, d = 5, and b = 2. 
Matrix (1a) 
Material payoffs 
 Group  Y 
 cooperation  defection 
Group X    
cooperation  10, 10  2, 15 
defection  15, 2  5, 5 
 
There are many real-life examples of games of this type. Game-playing groups are not 
necessarily formally organized groups. Three of the examples, with more following in 
section 4, are as follows: 
i)  Two rival political parties agree to have low-cost campaigns. There is no 
effective third-party enforcement of this agreement. They could cooperate by 
honouring the agreement, and each would win, say, more or less a half of the 
national assembly seats (a, a). Their payoffs are high. Alternatively, each could 
win more or less a half of the seats by both defecting (i.e., by running a high-
cost campaign). Their payoffs, the number of seats net of the costs, are lower 
(d, d). Suppose an unsuspected defection (i.e., running a high-cost campaign 
while the opponent party runs a low-cost campaign) can give the defecting 
party an overwhelming majority of the seats, leaving the rival party crippled 
with only a handful of seats as a result of its unreciprocated cooperation (c, b). 
This would set a stage for a PD game between the two parties.20 
                                                                                                 
20 The number of seats, net of the campaign costs, is a material payoff and can be defined on the basis of 
weights assigned to the number of the seats and the amount of campaign costs, both of which can be 
objectively enumerated.  
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ii)  Similarly, suppose two warring tribal groups have agreed on a ceasefire, 
without effective third-party enforcement. Honouring the ceasefire agreement 
would bring genuine peace to both tribes (a, a). Both can lose, in comparison 
with (a, a), by continuing to wage the war (d, d). An unsuspected defection, 
however, would give the defecting group a chance to overwhelm the opponent 
group (c, b). 
iii)  Rural residents could agree, for example, to accept a proposal to open up the 
farm market and to increase public investment in rural areas, whereas urban 
residents, who are expected to benefit from an increase in the imports of farm 
products, could agree to accept a cut in urban public investment programmes 
to finance an increase in public investments in rural areas. Without an effective 
government enforcement of such a compromise, the two groups might choose 
to defect (i.e., for the status quo). 
Case 1b 
In case (1b), for which the payoff matrix shown in Matrix (1b), the dominant strategy is 
‘cooperation’ for either of the players. In this case, the payoffs may be ordered as: 
a > c > b > d, where, for example, a = 10, c = 9, b = 6, d = 5. 
Now consider inter-player payoff spillover. Each game-playing group’s objective is to 
pursue the maximum of perceived payoffs, represented by weighted averages of its and 
the opponent’s material payoffs for each combination of actions. The nature of this 
game differs from that of the previous one. The weight (λ) in this case ranges between a 
value between zero and infinity, but not zero or infinity. In this case, in which material 
payoffs may have inter-player externalities, the perceived payoffs for Group X may take 
the form as given in Matrix (2). 
A methodologically-individualistic basis of this approach may be as follows: Agents’ 
perceived payoffs from a game are weighted averages of their own material payoffs and 
the opponent players’ material payoffs. In other words, payoffs have inter-personal 
spillover effects.21 Based on this approach, a key difference between collectivist and 
individualist societies may be highlighted as follows:22 In a collectivist society, members 
of a group use a λ (< 1) to form perceived payoffs by transforming the material payoffs 
when they play games with insiders (i.e., other members of their own groups), but use a λ 
(>1) when they play games with outsiders (i.e., members of a rival group).23 
                                                                                                 
21 This approach is in line with the practice of utility analysis in economics that has assumed altruism or 
envy, as well as of game theorists who have explored inter-player utility spillover phenomena. As 
mentioned, see Konrad (2002); Ahn et al. (2001); Englemann and Strobel (2000); Fehr and Schmidt 
(1999), and Gintis (2000) who discusses an insider-outsider model in which discriminators (the homo 
parochius) play a role.  
22 For the analysis in this paper, multiplying the payoffs by a constant would not alter the game 
outcomes. Utility analysis and game-theoretic models often normalize λc+(1-λ)b by dividing the 
expression by λ to obtain c+[(1-λ)/λ]b, in which (1-λ)/λ approaches, respectively infinity, 1, 0, -0.5, 
and -1, as λ approaches 0, 0.5, 1, 2, and infinity. For the analysis in this paper, the two formulations 
yield the same results. This traditional formulation indicates clearly that λ can neither be zero nor 
infinity.  
23 MacDonald (1998), drawing on Triandis (1990), highlights these characteristics of an extreme vertical 
collectivism: ‘Collectivist cultures … place a much greater emphasis on the goals … of the ingroup 




 Group  Y 
 cooperation  defection 
Group X    
cooperation  10, 10  6, 9 




 Group  Y 
 cooperation  defection 
Group X    
cooperation a  λb+ (1-λ)c 
Defection  λc+(1-λ)b d 
 
The values of λ for a member of a group differ for different insiders and outsiders. 
Collectivist group members may use different λ’s for insiders and outsiders for the 
following reasons:24 
i)  A positive weight (i.e., for the case of λ < 1) a game player attaches to an 
opponent game-player’s positive material payoff when the opponent is an 
insider may result from either one of a number of reasons: altruism arising 
from biological or cultural kinship and/or a sense that that the material payoff 
                                                                                                                                               
attachment” to the ingroup, including ‘the perception that ingroup norms are universally valid (a form 
of ethnocentricism), the automatic obedience to ingroup authorities, and willingness to fight and die 
for the ingroup. These characteristics are usually associated with distrust of and unwillingness to 
cooperate with outgroups…In collectivist cultures morality is conceptualized as that which benefits 
the group, and aggression and exploitation of outgroups are acceptable…’ The results of the 
experimental ultimatum (UG) and public good (PG) games, supported by the National Science 
Foundation and conducted by a team of social scientists, including S. Bowles, J. Ensminger, E. Fehr, 
H. Gintis, and J. Henrich, seem to be compatible with this formulation (see the summary of their 
results in ‘In Search of Homo economicus: Cooperation, Reciprocity, and Punishment in Fifteen 
Small-scale Societies’, available on the internet). In their anonymous one-shot game experiments, 
both individualist western and collectivist non-western subjects have not behaved like the rational 
economic man (REM). The difference between the non-western players and the western players, 
however, is notable. The former offered less than the latter as proposers in UGs and contributed less in 
PGs. While the sense of fairness to other human beings might explain the deviation of the results for 
both groups from theoretical predictions based on REM assumptions, the difference between the 
western and non-western group might reflect the difference in λ between the former and the latter, 
who might consider anonymous opponents in experimental games as outsiders. 
24 Collectivists in this paper belong to the homo egualis (Gintis 2000), with two different senses of 
asymmetric fairness: one toward insiders and the other toward the outsiders. With respect to wealthier 
members of society, they tend to tolerate more the higher incomes of insiders than those of outsiders. 
Their tolerance toward fellow group members’ high incomes might reflect their perception that they 
are community incomes. With respect to poorer members of society, they are more keen about 
reducing income inequalities vis-à-vis insiders than vis-à-vis outsiders. At an extreme, this type of 
fairness can yield a negative weight for an outsider’s increase in income or any positive income.   
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for a fellow group member is a shared property. 25   Many groups in a 
collectivist society have a long tradition of intra-group (e.g., intra-communal) 
joint property ownership and a system of informal intra-group transfers. These 
social arrangements may give rise to, and may also have their roots in a sense 
of cultural kinship.26 Evolutionary biologists have developed game-theoretic 
models of how gene-sharing siblings may achieve cooperation by using a λ < 1 
to transform PD material payoffs.27 
ii)  A negative weight (i.e., for the case of λ > 1) assigned for a material payoff of 
a rival may arise when a game player considers, as the norm, at most the status 
quo28 with regard to the income or wealth position of a rival. From a player’s 
perspective, any positive material payoff for a rival would imply the rival’s 
income or wealth position exceeding the norm, thus giving rise to a negative 
sense of well-being for the player.29 This reasoning may be extended to games 
between rival groups. A group may experience a negative externality (or a 
sense of envy) from a positive material payoff of its rival group. 
By contrast, members of an individualist society do not distinguish between members 
and nonmembers and use a λ = 1. 
Clearly, this is a simplified way to contrast collectivist and individualist societies. While 
the distinction between the two types of societies is a matter of degree, this formulation 
highlights their essential differences. 
For a group, values of λ, which may be considered the averages of individual λ’s and 
which the group uses to form its perceived payoffs, differ for different rival groups. This 
structure of perceived payoffs for an inter-group game indicates that individualism, as 
defined by λ = 1 is one of the special cases, which include the following additional 
unrealistic special cases: (i) If λ = 0.5, an inter-group Golden Rule would prevail. Each 
group would not distinguish between its payoffs and the opponent group’s payoffs. 
                                                                                                 
25 Research in cross-cultural psychology shows that members of vertically oriented collectivist societies 
in general tolerate an equal distribution of power or of material gains, but social norms require those 
with power to share the benefits they receive with fellow group members. 
26 See Bowles and Hopfensitz (2000) for a discussion of a model that explains how human beings might 
have formed groups of non-kin members and institutions for resources sharing among group members. 
The paper notes that inter-group conflicts could be an integral part of the processes of group formation. 
27 See Hirshleifer (2001) for a discussion of how two gene-sharing siblings tend to cooperate. Members 
of a collectivist society, in general, are under greater social pressure than their  individualist 
counterparts to help fellow group members. Collectivist societies tend to use greater social sanctions 
than their individualist counterparts to induce members to conform to social norms. This route to 
cooperation is different from that arising from repetition, as, for example, shown in Poundstone 
(1992), which shows how a zigzag flies into a crocodile’s mouth to eat insects between the crocodile’s 
teeth and flies out without being swallowed by the crocodile.  
28 Or zero, without loss of generality. 
29 In a collectivist society, a group member may not wish to tolerate any increase in the income of the 
members (outsiders) of a rival group. A positive material payoff of the latter would cause such an 
increase, which should give rise to a negative sense of well-being for the former. This phenomenon is 
not incompatible with a positive sense of well-being the group member derives from a fellow group 
member’s rise in income.  
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(ii) With  λ close to 0, each group would acquire sainthood. The groups would be 
selfless. 
When λ > 1, the value of each group’s perceived payoff declines when the opponent 
group’s positive material payoff rises. This paper notes that this feature of collectivism 
aggravates inter-group conflicts.30 
The analysis in this paper proceeds with the assumption that λ’s, which are cultural 
parameters, are given for individual and group agents. The analysis of how their values 
change for individuals and societies is beyond the scope of this paper, although 
section  4 has some limited discussion of how they may change. Cross-cultural 
psychologists distinguish between acculturation and enculturation, which have 
implications for changes in the values of λ (Berry et al. 1992). They also note that 
agents go through different stages—compliance, identification, and internalization—in 
acquiring social values (Lieberman 1956). Anthropologists have pointed out that 
individualism emerged in Europe gradually through the late Middle Age, but before the 
industrial revolution (MacFarlane 1987). As already mentioned, evolutionary game 
models have analysed long-term group formation. 
As stated in the beginning of this section, the discussion in this paper assumes that λij’s, 
as well as the material payoffs, are known to all game-playing groups. These are not 
unreasonable, since λij’s reflect the values shared by group members; while individuals 
have different λij’s, their differences between the members of a game-playing group are 
smaller than those between the members of different groups. Moreover, for simplicity, 
the discussion assumes that λij = λji, which is denoted as λj, the subscript j of which is 
dropped when discussing a game between two specific groups. The values of λ for 
groups are the averages of the λ’s for group members.31  
A small λ (e.g., sufficiently less than 1) will turn a PD game, for example, with material 
payoffs in Matrix (1a), into a game that yields mutual cooperation. A large λ exceeding 
1 (for example 2) will turn a game that has material payoffs represented by, for example, 
Matrix (1b), and, thus, should yield mutual cooperation in the absence of inter-group or 
inter-personal welfare externalities, into a PD game.32 
Are there any mechanisms through which two groups voluntarily may choose to 
cooperate in a PD game without third-party enforcing rules? Game theory suggests the 
following conditions for cooperation: 
a)  Depending on the nature of transactions, the two rival groups can agree to 
modify the material payoffs to ensure mutual cooperation. An example is for a 
                                                                                                 
30 Excessive retaliations in inter-group conflicts and negative campaigns in a heated election might be 
only a couple of symptoms of a negative weight. 
31 A special case would be the case in which all members of a group share a same λj. The analysis can 
proceeds with a more general case in which different group members have different λj’s. Group 
cohesiveness, however, implies that group members’ λj values are similar.  
32 In general, with a payoff structure as in Matrix (2), the game becomes a PD game when λ > (a-b)/(c-b) 
and λ > (c-d)/(c-b) provided that c-b > 0, which says that defection pays off for a defector when 
matched by cooperation in a one-off game. This relation (c-b>0) between b and c is realistic for both a 
non-PD game and a PD game. With λ>1, some non-PD game payoffs would be perceived by the 
players as PD games.  
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borrowing group to assure a lending group full repayment by providing 
collateral to the lending group for a borrowing that will yield returns to be 
shared by the two groups. This road to cooperation may not be feasible in 
many PD games, as in the case where two social groups confront PD games of 
choosing policies that would imply different future payoffs. 
b)  If they act rationally in the sense that they act in accordance with the Kantian 
principles of categorical imperatives, they can develop rules of the game that 
require them to cooperate and subject themselves to such rules.33 Rival groups 
in collectivist societies would not act in this manner. 
c)  Finally, the groups can choose to cooperate when they (i) care about each other 
or (ii) repeat to play a game.34 As explained below, these conditions are not 
easy to fulfil in a collectivist society. 
Consider the precise conditions for cooperation. A simple model may highlight key 
aspects of how groups succeed or fail to cooperate. Suppose pairs of groups, with 
different values of λj’s are playing games with the material payoffs in Matrix (1) in a 
general form. The games have a variety of material payoffs. Some of them have 
material payoffs similar to Matrix (1a); the others have material payoffs similar to 
Matrix (1b). Cultural collectivism implies that the game-playing groups are internally 
cohesive rival groups which play games by using a value of λj greater than 1, as in 
Matrix (2), to transform the material payoffs. With a λj whose value is equal to or 
greater than 1, the players cannot attain mutual cooperation in a one-off PD game; if λj 
is sufficiently large, they may not attain mutual cooperation even in games that would 
normally yield such cooperation. This is the world this paper will analyse. 
To show the conditions for cooperation between two groups, however, the analysis 
starts with the assumption that λ (with the subscript suppressed) can have a range of 
values, not necessarily larger than 1. How do two groups achieve cooperation in a PD 
game if they are allowed to be in a most conducive environment for cooperation? To 
show the conditions for attaining mutual cooperation in a PD game, assume that the 
groups repeat to play the game indefinitely and that what matters for them are their 
perceived payoffs. In this case, their payoffs are the present discounted values (PDVs) 
of their future perceived payoffs. For forming the PDVs, the players have to form their 
strategies and have to predict how their opponents would play the game. This paper 
examines the consequences of two strategies: (a) a tit-for-tat (TfT) and (b) a trigger 
strategy. 
Note that this analysis has departed from the ‘rational economic man’ assumption by 
introducing the concept of perceived payoffs. The TfT strategy is based on reciprocity 
and has proven in the Axelrod experiment to be a sound strategy for players to use. The 
trigger strategy used in this paper is widely discussed in game theory textbooks, as a 
                                                                                                 
33 The categorical imperative requires members of a society to consider the consequences of an 
individual action they want to take under the assumption that all members of the society would take 
the same action. The players of a PD game, when they have Kantian rationality, would voluntarily 
cooperate with each other (Romp 1997: 264). Such rationality would help a society develop a credible 
rule of law that punishes defection. 
34 See Axelrod (1984).  
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strategy that is effective in inducing cooperation between players. On the basis of each 
of these two strategies, this paper will show the conditions for two groups, by choosing 
their strategies on the basis of the PDVs of the future streams of perceived payoffs, to 
achieve a unique Nash equilibrium in which cooperation strictly dominates defection. 
Consider the case in which they use a TfT strategy.35  Suppose each group uses a 
tit-for-tat rule and assumes that the opponent group will also follow such a rule. Under 
such a rule, at every round, each group reciprocates the opponent group’s cooperation, 
and retaliates by defection against the opponent group’s defection, in the previous round. 
This rule implies that both mutual cooperation and mutual defection are sustainable 
outcomes: C-C, C-C, C-C, … and D-D, D-D, D-D, … An initial defection matched by 
cooperation oscillates permanently: D-C, C-D, D-C, … Similarly, an unreciprocated 
initial cooperation also oscillates permanently: C-D, D-C, C-D,  …  . The relevant 
perceived payoffs, in terms of PDVs with i denoting the discount rate, for Group X are 
as follows, arranged in accordance with the initial strategies chosen by the players (see 
Matrix 3):36 
Matrix (3) 
Perceived payoffs in terms of PDVs 
 Group  Y 
 cooperation  defection 
Group X    






What would be the conditions for each group to determine that cooperation is the 
dominant strategy regardless of whether the opponent’s strategy is cooperation or 
defection? The conditions, solved for λ, are as follows:37 
λ < (a-b)/(c-b) + [2a-(c+b)]/[(c-b)i]  (1a) 
λ < (c-d)/(c-b) + [(b+c)-2d]/[(c-b)i]  (1b) 
                                                                                                 
35 Note that this TfT strategy may not be a subgame perfect equilibrium for the infinitely repeated PD 
game with the assumed perceived payoffs. See Osborne (2004) for a discussion of the conditions for 
mutual TfT strategies to be a subgame perfect equilibrium of an infinitely repeated PD game. This 
paper examines the consequences of a TfT strategy as a plausible strategy for players to use to achieve 
their respective maximum gains, not necessary to force others to cooperate, even if it may not be a 
subgame perfect equilibrium, because it is firmly based on reciprocation and, thus is a plausible 
strategy in a collectivist world, where reciprocation is widespread for inter-personal and inter-group 
transactions. One might challenge that it is not a subgame perfect equilibrium and, thus, is not credible. 
A response to this challenge would be to point out that the game theorist Anatol Rapoport won the 
Axelrod tournament by using a TfT while being fully aware of this property of the TfT. 
36 The PDV of the infinite series of a payoff amounting to ‘a’ is calculated as a[1/(1+i) + 1/(1+i)
2+ … ].  
37 A TfT normally means that the players begin to play a game by choosing C-C, which sustains when 
the players use a TfT. The conditions in Eqs. (1a) and (1b) would ensure that the players would not 
deviate from the TfT for short-run gains as far as they know that the opponent uses a TfT.   
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If these inequalities are solved for i, the same inequalities have the following forms: 
i < [2a-(c+b)]/[λ(c-b)-(a-b)] (1c) 
i < [(b+c)-2d]/[λ(c-b)-(c-d)] (1d) 
provided that  
λ > (c-b)-(a-b) > 0 and λ > (c-b)/(c-d) or 
λ > (a-b)/(c-b) and λ >(c-d)/(c-b) 
Figure 1 provides an overview:38 
a)  If λ < (a-b)/(c-b) and λ < (c-d)/(c-b), cooperation is ensured regardless of the 
level of i.39 This is the case of a sufficiently small λ (i.e., a high degree of 
Group X’s altruism). The differences a-b and c-d are ‘Group Y’s gains’ (the 
former when Group Y chooses C and the latter when Group Y chooses D) 
associated with Group X’s switch from D to C. The difference c-b is the 
‘payoff differential’ between Group X and Group Y associated with Group X’s 
unsuspected defection. In this case, Group X chooses to cooperate if λ is 
smaller than the ratio between a-b and c-b. For a given amount of a-b or c-d, a 
large c-b, which tends to yield a low value of the ratio, would require a strong 
sense of altruism (a small λ) to induce Group X to choose cooperation. For a 
given amount of c-b, a large a-b or c-d can induce Group X to cooperate even 
with a weak sense of altruism (a large λ). 
b)  If  λ > (a-b)/(c-b) and λ > (c-d)/(c-b), a low i matters for cooperation. In 
addition, the following factors matter: 
i)  A large [2a-(c+b)]/(c-b) and a large [(c+b)-2d]/(c-b) (i.e., large social 
gains both groups achieve by moving from mutual defection to mutual 
cooperation) relative to the c-b will create a large chance of Group X’s 
cooperation even with a large λ and a high i. 
ii)  For given levels of the ratio between social gains and c-b, a low i will 
tend to promote cooperation with a large λ. 
A trigger strategy does not alter the conclusions qualitatively: (1) Mutual cooperation or 
mutual defection would be sustainable and (2) unsuspected initial defection or 
unreciprocated initial cooperation would be followed by sustained mutual defection. In 
                                                                                                 
38 The discussion here assumes that both 2a-(c+b) and (c+b)-2d are positive. The diagram in Figure 1 is 
based on the assumption that 2a-(c+b)>0. When they are negative, cooperation would be achieved as 
far as their absolute values are small enough to ensure that Eqs. (1a) and (1b) are satisfied with a 
positive λ, which in this paper is assumed to be nonnegative. 
39  These conditions are satisfied automatically when λ  =  0.5, thus giving rise to ‘unconditional 
cooperation’, which Hirshleifer (2001) defines as the Golden Rule.   
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this case, the two inequalities that ensure that cooperation would be the dominant 
strategy is as follows:40 
λ< (a-b)/(c-b) + (a-d)/[(c-b)i]  (2a) 
λ< (c-d)/(c-b)  (2b) 
The trigger strategy is more ‘harshly punishing’ than the TfT. When one of the players 
defects, both defect in all future rounds. When the inequalities for the TfT (Eqs (1a) and 
(1b)) and the trigger strategy (Eqs (2a) and (2b)) are compared, the first terms ((a-b)/(c-b) 
and (c-d)/c-b)) in the right-hand sides of both Eqs (1a) and (1b) and Eqs (2a) and (2b) are 
the same, but the numerators of the second terms are different (2a-(c+b) and (c+b)-2d in 
Eqs (1a) and (1b), compared with (a-d) and 0 in Eqs (2a) and (2b)). 
Figure 1 
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In the figure, the degree of inter-group rivalry (λ) is measured along the horizontal axis, 
and the discount rate (i) along the vertical axis. The assumed material payoffs are c = 15, 
a = 10, d = 5, and b = 2. The i-λ combinations that satisfy the inequality in Eq. (1a), λ < 
(a-b)/(c-b) + [2a-(c+b)]/[(c-b)i], ensure cooperation between the two rival groups when 
they use a TfT strategy as described in the text. With the assumed material payoffs, the 
inequality in Eq. (1b), λ < (c-d)/(c-b) + [(c+b)-2d]/[(c-b)i], is satisfied if the inequality 
in (1a) is satisfied. Therefore, the i-λ combinations that satisfy Eq. (1a), on the basis of 
which the graph is drawn, would ensure mutual cooperation under the TfT strategy. On 
the basis of the TfT assumption and of the PDVs of the perceived payoffs, the 
equilibrium is the unique Nash equilibrium in which, for both players, sustained mutual 
cooperation strictly dominates any other strategy. 
For the first inequalities (Eqs (1a) and (2a)), the comparison in the second term is 
between the net social gains (2a-(c+b)) both players achieve when the group X switches 
its initial strategy from unsuspected defection (D-C) to mutual cooperation (C-C) (in the 
                                                                                                 
40 When the players play an infinitely repeated PD game with perceived payoffs, one can show that the 
trigger strategy considered here is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Not only mutual cooperation can be 
sustainable with no incentive for any player to defect when the discount rate is low, but also mutual 
defection can be sustainable with any discount rate. See Osborne (1994). The conditions in Eqs (2a) 
and (2b) would ensure sustained C-C as the outcome.    
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case of the TfT) and the per player net social gains (a-d) associated with moving from 
mutual defection (D-D) to mutual cooperation (C-C) (in the case of the trigger strategy). 
For the second inequalities (Eqs (1b) and (2b)), the comparison is between the net social 
gains ((c+b)-2d) both players achieve when the group X switches its initial strategy 
from mutual defection (D-D) to unreciprocated cooperation (C-D) (in the case of the 
TfT) and zero (in the case of the trigger strategy). In the trigger strategy, the second 
inequality (2b) is independent of i; a lower i does not help even when the play is 
repeated, or repetition does not improve chances for cooperation.41 
A comparison of the inequalities for the TfT and the trigger strategy suggests that, for a 
given i and under the following conditions, C would strictly dominate D with a higher 
level of λ when both players use the TfT than when they use the trigger strategy: 
2a–(c+b)>a–d and (c+b)–2d>0, which can be restated as a+d>c+b>2d.42 
These conditions highlight the difficulties for internally cohesive rival groups to achieve 
cooperation without third-party coordination. They suggest that, with either the TfT or 
the trigger strategy considered here, even with λ =1, only a sufficiently low i would 
ensure mutual cooperation when c-b (seduction to defection) is large. With λ > 1, i 
should be even lower. Neither λ (a reduction of which is the most straightforward road 
to cooperation) nor i is under the control of either the game-playing groups or, if there is 
one, a third party (e.g., a coordinator or a rule enforcer). The value of λ exceeds 1 in 
collectivist societies by their nature. Moreover, societies with collectivist values are 
often those in which rules are not well established, established rules are enforced with 
discretion, future is uncertain, and, therefore, i is high. That is, game players, in general, 
heavily discount gains that they might attain in a distant future. 
How can rival groups with a λ in excess of 1 achieve cooperation without a low i? The 
following subsection discuss how forming hybrid groups can do so. 
3.4  Forming hybrid groups 
Can there be a road to cooperation via third-party coordination? Clearly, it is possible for 
an  outsider to force the groups to cooperate. For example, a foreign army or a UN 
peacekeeping force could force itself into a warring society. Alternatively, a degree of 
rationality could induce two warring tribes, X and Y, in a country to accept the authority 
of a foreign peacekeeping force to coordinate their actions. Thus, there could be 
effectively enforced rules that require the two groups to choose only cooperation. This 
would provide higher payoffs to both. Such steps are, however, normally unrealistic.43 
                                                                                                 
41 As mentioned, however, note that mutual D-D is a subgame perfect equilibrium with any discount rate.  
42 These conditions are satisfied if, for example, c=11, a=10, d=4, and b=2. In the context of Cournot 
models, Abreu (1986) has used a stronger credible punishment strategy. As shown by Gibbons (1992), 
however, Abreu’s strategy also requires a low discount rate, although it achieves cooperation at a 
higher discount rate than the trigger strategy considered in this paper. 
43 Hofstede’s analysis indicates that collectivist nations tend to have a higher degree of nationalism than 
individualist nations.  
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How could cooperation emerge without third-party enforcement from within a society? 
The rest of this paper analyses a seemingly unrealistic road to cooperation, that is, via 
forming hybrid groups and, thus, changing the nature of the games. The paper then 
interprets three historical episodes, in which three societies tamed inter-group conflicts by 
travelling on this road. The rest of this section considers the mechanics of a set of rules 
aimed at promoting cooperation by forming hybrid groups and discusses how, in 
conjunction with repeating the game, they may lead two rival groups to cooperation.  
Suppose two rival tribes of an equal size (i.e., each with Z members) were engaged in a 
PD game with a material payoff structure as shown in Matrix (1a). Each tribe would 
select its representative, and the two representatives would play the game repeatedly on 
behalf of their respective tribes. The solution would be mutual defection unless i is low. A 
value of λ exceeding 1 by a large margin would imply intense conflicts, and would make 
it even more difficult for the two groups to choose mutual cooperation. 
How would these two tribes achieve mutual cooperation by forming hybrid groups? The 
discussion proceeds, initially, without considering how the two rival groups would agree 
on these new rules of the game. Later, however, the paper addresses the question of how 
they may agree on such new rules of the game. 
Suppose the members of X and Y were to agree to form two new groups, XN and YN. 
This agreement could be achieved internally or via a third-party intervention.44 Suppose 
XN, one of these two new groups, were to draw a certain fraction (0.5 < α < 1) of its 
members from X, and the rest (1-α) from Y. Similarly, YN were to draw a fraction (1-α) of 
its members from X and the rest (α) from Y. The change in groups would be as follows: 
Original groups 
  Group X  Z members of the X tribe 
Group Y  Z members of the Y tribe 
Hybrid groups 
 Group  XN  αZ members of the X tribe and (1- α)Z members of the Y tribe 
 Group  YN  (1-  α)Z members of the X tribe and αZ members of the Y tribe. 
Suppose these two hybrid groups were engaged in playing political and economic PD 
games. They were to play a game with a material payoff matrix resembling 
Matrix (1a). How would XN and YN play each game if they were to play the game, on 
behalf of, respectively, X and Y and with a material payoff structure as in Matrix (1a)? 
For example, X and Y could be two pure ethnic groups, and XN and YN could be new 
ethnically-mixed groups.  
Note that XN and YN would play the game that provides payoffs to X and Y. For 
example, X and Y are the groups of residents in two regions RX and RY. The game to 
be played by XN and YN provides payoffs to the groups X and Y, whose members 
receive benefit from their groups’ payoffs. More specifically, XN and YN would play 
                                                                                                 
44 Forming hybrid groups are not necessarily simple as it seems here. When it is feasible to form them, 
why it has happened in some societies, how it can happen in other societies, and whether it fits in a 
longer, broader game-model framework are discussed in the following section of this paper.  
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a policy game that provides specific payoffs to the residents of RX (i.e., members of X) 
and the residents of RY (i.e., members of Y).45 
The outcome of this game would depend on their internal decision rules. If the 
majority members of XN and YN were to select their representatives who would play 
the game only to maximize the interests of the majority members (i.e., members of X 
in XN and members of Y in YN), the solution would still be mutual defection. This 
would happen when the political system allows either (1) a winner to take all or (2) 
the majority to be tyrants.  
Suppose, however, that political competition within hybrid groups forced the 
candidates, who would need the minority votes to be elected and re-elected, to commit 
their strategies as follows: Each elected representative, likely to be a member of the 
majority group in each hybrid group (e.g., a member of the X tribe in the new group 
XN), would play the game on the basis of weighted averages of perceived payoffs, 
defined to have as its elements the weighted averages of the perceived payoffs for X 
and Y, with the weights equal to β and 1-β.46  
How would the representative choose β? Suppose that the representative of XN were 
to choose the value of β to be equal to α.47 With  α and 1-α assumed to be the 
proportions of the tribes X and Y in XN, the perceived payoff matrix for XN would be 
as given in Matrix (4) . 
The game is assumed to have a symmetric payoff structure, and the perceived payoffs 
for YN would be similarly formed. The perceived payoff matrix would turn to the 
original material payoff matrix when α = λ=1. 
Matrix (4)  
Perceived payoffs in terms of PDVs 
 Group  YN 
 cooperation  defection 
Group XN    
Cooperation a  α[λb+(1-λ )c] 
+(1-α)[λc +(1-λ)b] 




                                                                                                 
45 There are many real-world examples of this problem. A reform could provide different benefits for the 
RX region and the RY region, which, respectively, have pure ethnic groups as residents. The two 
regions are likely to be in a defection trap in PD games. Creation of hybrid ethnic groups for political 
decisionmaking would not alter how the residents benefit from the reform. It would only alter 
incentives for the politicians who play PD games on behalf of their hybrid constituencies.  
46 Why would the representatives use weighted averages of perceived payoffs, not of material payoffs? 
Because perceived payoffs, not material payoffs, are what voters would care about. 
47 The weighted averages of the payoffs based on, for example, α and 1-α as weights for XN are equal to 
the aggregate payoffs of XN under the assumption that the material payoffs, c and b, are distributed 
equally among the members of X and Y in XN. In this case, if all the group members have a same 
value of λ, promising to use α and 1-α as weights is equivalent to promising to play the game fairly to 
the two constituency groups.  
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An α sufficiently smaller than 1 and close to 0.5 would ensure that cooperation would 
be the dominant strategy. Suppose that the rules were to require that the representatives 
would have to reveal to the voters in their respective groups the weights with which 
they would form the perceived payoffs. Suppose that, during their term, they were to 
play many games with different material payoff structures. The games would still be 
played without third-party rules, and if they were PD games on the basis of the weighted 
averages of the perceived payoffs, there would be no third-party intervention to ensure 
cooperation. 48  The voters in hybrid groups (i.e., XN and YN) would assess the 
representatives’ records of playing games during their term and would re-elect them if 
they have played the games faithfully with the value of α to which they were committed 
at the time of their election.49 
Intuitively, cooperation would be easier to achieve if the hybrid groups, through their 
representatives, played the game repeatedly with a low i (e.g., close to zero) and a low α 
(i.e., less than 1 and close to 0.5 in this example). The following conditions would 
ensure that cooperation becomes the dominant strategy in an infinite series of plays of a 
game between groups XN and YN with a PD perceived payoff structure:50 
α < [(a-λb)+(λ-1)c]/[(2λ-1)(c-b)] + [2a-(c+b)]/[(2λ-1)(c-b)i] (3a) 
α < [(λc-d-(λ-1)b)/[(2λ-1)(c-b)] + [(b+c)-2d]/[(2λ-1)(c-b)i] (3b) 
The game is now played between XN and YN (to put it exactly, between their 
representatives), not between X and Y. With a sufficiently low α, less than a threshold, 
the hybrid groups achieve mutual cooperation without repeating the play. With the 
value of α exceeding the threshold, only repeating the play with a low i would ensure 
mutual cooperation. The α-i combinations satisfying these inequalities could be shown 
as the area under hyperbolas satisfying equations obtained by replacing each inequality 
sign in Eqs (3a) and (3b) with an equality, with α and i measured, respectively, along 
the horizontal and vertical axes.  While the two hyperbolas may cross, when they do not 
cross, the area under one of them will indicate sufficient conditions for sustained mutual 
cooperation to be the unique Nash equilibrium when the groups play the game on the 
basis of the PDVs of the future streams of the weighted averages of the perceive payoffs 
and by using the TfT. 
Severe inter-group conflicts (i.e., a large λ) require a low α. The value of λ is a cultural 
parameter and is not under the control of the reformer, or, as discussed later, of an 
institutional entrepreneur. The value of α, however, is a political parameter subject to 
negotiation at the time of forming hybrid groups. A low α will increase chances for 
cooperation. Under the decision rule discussed above, forming hybrid groups alters the 
                                                                                                 
48 Thus, the games XN and YN play are noncooperative games. 
49 The parameter α would be an issue for a reform; the parameter β would be an issue for an election 
campaign. Competition among candidates for minority votes would keep pressing the candidate to 
promise a β equal to α, which is the value of β assumed to be chosen by the representatives in this 
paper. There is no reason why this campaign promise should not be revealed to the opposition group. 
Therefore, the transformed payoffs are shared knowledge of the players, and the game is still a game 
of complete information. 
50 The required α to achieve cooperation is a function of not only the material payoffs, but also λ. When 
λ approaches infinity, an α close to 0.5 would ensure cooperation.  
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nature of the game. The earlier rival groups, X and Y, sought their own special interests; 
the new groups, XN and YN, with a value of α sufficiently close to 0.5, would seek 
encompassing interests.51 
Note that forming hybrid groups (XN and YN) for political games would not do away 
with the existing natural groups (X and Y). If X and Y are residents of two different 
regions, forming hybrid groups does not imply that they have to be relocated. They 
simply will agree to be members of new hybrid groups, which will agree to play with 
each other for certain political games through their representatives. If the natural groups 
(residents in certain regions or tribes) exist as political groups, they will continue to 
exist and use new political rules to play some (not necessarily all) political games with 
one another. 
The original groups will be effective for advocating some political agenda of their own. 
As noted, however, the political games among the original groups tend unable to get out 
of defection traps in divisive political agenda. In these cases, the games between hybrid 
groups could form a second tier of political decisionmaking, providing checks and 
balances to the first-tier process involving pure groups and a way out of defection traps. 
4  Applications of the model 
Group-oriented values make it more difficult for a collectivist society than for an 
individualist society to achieve the potential gains xj = 2cj – 2dj, j = 1, 2, 3, …, J, where 
j is an index of different PD games. The preceding analysis suggests that forming hybrid 
groups will increase chances for the society to attain these gains. The hybrid groups, XN 
and YN, become institutionally  engineered  political siblings, comparable to gene-
sharing biological siblings. Forming hybrid political groups can change the nature of 
games. Chances of cooperation will increase. There have been at least three historical 
episodes in which societies have tamed inter-group conflicts by forming hybrid political 
groups and promoted cooperation, in accordance with the preceding principles.  
4.1  Reforms in ancient Athens, colonial America, and Singapore 
The Cleisthenes Constitution helped ancient Athens, a collectivist society, promote 
inter-group cooperation. Colonial America, suffering from group-orientation without 
being collectivist, formed a political union under a constitution that established the 
US  Senate, which provides a political game-playing field among sectorally and 
ethnically hybrid groups of states. Singapore adopted group representation 
constituencies (GRC) that help tame inter-ethnic conflicts. The particular manner in 
which these historical episodes unfolded was not unlike the manner in which 
Schumpeterian technological innovations take place, and their emergence can be 
                                                                                                 
51 The Cleisthenes Constitution, discussed in the following section, designed the 10 new tribes largely to 
have balanced representation of diverse interest groups. In a two-group context, this implies an α of 
0.5. The US Constitution does not have legally-fixed proportions, the shares of interest groups are 
determined by the composition of interest groups in each state. In Singapore, each GRC includes one 
minority member. Since the size of the GRC varies, however, the proportion of the minority member 
in a GRC varies across GRCs. The system seems to allow an overrepresentation of minorities, and this 
very feature of the system may be a key factor underlying the success of the system.   
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explained in the framework of evolutionary game theory. In these episodes, widely 
dispersed throughout space and time in history, institutional entrepreneurs helped the 
societies introduce new rules (e.g., constitutions, an election law) that turned inter-group 
conflicts into more productive political interactions that have resulted in cooperation. As 
shown below, the phyle in ancient Athens, the states as the electoral districts for the US 
Senate, and the candidate groups running for group representation constituencies in 
Singapore are historical examples of institutionally engineered political siblings. 
In 682 BC, Athens abandoned monarchy and adopted a government of elected officials 
(archons), but had serious economic, social, and political problems—most of all, strife 
among tribes, between low-income groups and wealthy aristocrats, and among 
regions.52 In spite of Solon’s reform, including debt cancellations, Athens fell into the 
hands of tyrants. Some of these tyrants pursued land reform and other populist policies, 
but could not resolve deep-rooted factionalism and economic stagnation.  
In 510 BC, Athens turned to Cleisthenes, the head of a prominent family, to lead a 
constitutional reform effort. Cleisthenes led Athens to establish a constitution aimed at a 
new system of political competition. The constitution (i) required all men 18 years or 
older to belong to one of the villages (demes), which numbered about 170 throughout 
Attica; (ii) divided Attica into three regions, which had a common agricultural basis, but 
each representing one of Attica’s three diverse interests: handicrafts, fishing, and timber; 
(iii) organized each of the three regions into 10 groups or thirds (trittyes) in such a 
manner that the demes of a single group were not necessarily contiguous pieces of land, 
thus creating 30 groups in Attica; (iv) formed 10 new artificial tribes (phyle) by drawing 
by lot three groups from each region; (v) and formed the Council of 500 
representatives.53 
The constitution removed from the political process a source of inter-tribal and other 
inter-group conflicts. Thus, the reform ‘transformed Attica from a country of squabbling 
clans  …  preoccupied with zero-sum redistribution into the world’s first democracy’ 
(Mueller 2001).54 When accepted, the 500 councillors took the oath ‘to advise what is 
best for the state’ (Hammond 1986: 190). 
Following the Declaration of Independence, the 13 American colonies clashed over 
regional and sectoral interests. Hamilton and others advocated a strong federal 
                                                                                                 
52 This summary is based on Everson (1996), Finley (1959), Hammond (1986), and Mueller (2001). 
53 The Council of 500 was chosen annually not by election, but by lot, 50 from each tribe. The tribes 
took the presidency in rotation (by lot) for 1/10 of the year. The system reflected the Athenian 
preference for democracy over efficiency (Jones 1957: 117).  
54 With regard to the Cleisthenes Constitution, Aristotle has noted that the constitution made old groups 
(e.g., extended families) less influential by forming new groups (e.g., new tribes): ‘Fresh tribes and 
brotherhoods should be established; the private rites of families should be restricted and converted 
into public ones; in short, every contrivance should be adopted which will mingle the citizens with 
one another and get rid of old connexions’. (Everson 1996). The administrators (magistrates), the 
Council of 500 (representatives), and the assembly (open meeting of all interested citizens) had an 
elaborate system of checks and balances. The magistrates were chosen by lot. The ten new tribes took 
turns to take the presidency in rotation by lot for a tenth of the year each. The presiding (artificial) 
tribe’s foreman was also drawn by lot. This system, while criticized by Socrates for not being efficient, 
reflected the Athenian preference for democracy over efficiency (Jones 1957: 17) and, at the same 
time, helped the Athenians avoid destructive inter-group or inter-personal rivalry (Jones 1957).   
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government and promotion of manufacturing; others, such as Jefferson, strong states 
and promotion of agriculture. The Founding Fathers’ role was important in building a 
new nation based on the principles that reveal deep insights into both human strengths 
and limitations. Madison’s and Hamilton’s role was particularly critical in framing the 
US Constitution (see Ellis 2001). A guiding principle was to protect the constitutional 
process from factional influences. North stresses this aspect: ‘Thus, Madison  … 
maintained that the constitutional structure was devised in 1787 not only to facilitate 
certain kinds of exchange, but also to raise the costs of those kinds of exchange that 
promote the interests of factions’ (North 1990: 47).55 Hamilton, beginning as a strong 
advocate of a strong national government, was a tireless supporter of the new 
constitution through the end of the making of the constitution, writing a large number of 
the Federalist Papers, some of them in collaboration with Madison. 
One of the features of the constitution was the US Senate. 56  A  conventional 
interpretation of the political meaning of the US Senate is that the creation of the Senate 
was based on the principles of state independence (e.g., de Tocqueville 1848: 118-9). 
Moreover, a bicameral system provides checks and balances within the legislative 
branch. This is true. The Senate’s another important institutional significance was, 
however, that it has turned the nature of political games. Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962: 235) note that the bicameral system established rules of the game in which ‘no 
legislation could find majority support in both houses unless it was genuinely to the 
“general” interest of the whole social group’.  
A way to look at this phenomenon on the basis of the analytical framework presented in 
this paper is to compare how the US representatives and the senators play legislative 
games. The members of the House represent relatively small districts, which have fairly 
well-defined, relatively narrow sectoral, regional, or even ethnic interests. For example, 
a district that elects a representative to the House may be an agricultural district, a 
Hispanic district, an automobile district, or an urban district. A district that elects a 
senator, however, is a whole state. In general, even a small state is relatively large and 
includes both urban and rural areas, several industries, and a number of ethnic groups.  
Therefore, in a legislative PD game concerning a sharply conflictive rural-urban issue, 
members of the House are likely to form clear coalitions along rural-urban lines. 
Senators, however, must be prepared to represent encompassing interests, including a 
variety of sectoral, regional, and ethnic interests, which comprise their constituencies, 
which may be compared more to Cleisthenes’ artificial tribes than to Attica’s original 
tribes (i.e., to either XN or YN than to X or Y discussed in the preceding section). 
Kennedy (1956) has noted that a US senator should have national perspectives.57 
Unlike Cleisthenes, the American Founding Fathers did not form hybrid political groups. 
Establishing the Senate, however, meant the emergence of the states as hybrid groups 
with political significance over time. 
                                                                                                 
55 See also Mueller (2001) for a similar view.  
56 The Federalist Papers reveal that the framers of the new constitution had considered the lessons of the 
political institutions in history, including in ancient Greece and Rome. It is, however, not evident that 
they had considered the lessons of the Cleisthenes Constitution, although the Federalist Papers make it 
clear that the Senate should have longer-term national perspectives. 
57 Federalist Papers also stress this point. See Federalist Paper No. 62.  
27 
Singapore transformed itself in merely 35 years from a poor third-world economy to a 
highly competitive, wealthy, and modern rules-based economy. Singapore is a culturally 
collectivist country, where majority Chinese and Malays, Indians, and other ethnic 
minority groups comprise a diverse population. Racial strife was not uncommon. 
Establishing a rules-based economic system without abandoning a collectivist culture 
has been a notable achievement. 
Under the leadership of Lee Kuan Yew, the government pursued policies to help 
Singaporeans put the interests of the nation above those of ethnic groups (Lee 2000).58 
In one of the efforts to this end, the government instituted a housing policy aimed at 
promoting ethnically integrated neighbourhoods. To discourage one ethnic group from 
occupying an entire apartment building, the government imposed a quota for each 
ethnic group in each building in new apartment complexes. While helping Singapore 
achieve racially integrated neighbourhoods, however, this housing policy made it 
virtually impossible in Parliamentary and local elections for non-Chinese minority 
candidates to defeat Chinese candidates customarily supported by group-oriented 
Chinese majority voters.  
To ensure that minority groups are represented in the Parliament, the government 
instituted a system of group representation constituencies (GRCs), which were created 
by amalgamating three or four single-member constituencies and then contested by 
groups of three or four candidates each. Each candidate group is required to include a 
minority candidate (Lee 2000: 206-10).59 In this example, the hybrid candidate groups 
are comparable to XN or YN, rather than to X or Y. Their collective campaign promises 
would be different from a collection of campaign promises that would be put forward by 
them individually as separate candidates. The GRC system obviously has achieved more 
than merely allowing minority candidates to be elected. That this is clearly an intended 
result is obvious in the Select Committee report. 
The GRC system of election will encourage, if not compel, political 
parties to accommodate the interest of all racial groups in their election 
manifestos and programmes before their election to Parliament. With 
political parties fielding multi-racial teams of candidates in GRCs, no 
party contesting in a GRC can afford to campaign on extreme communal 
platforms without losing the support of the candidates whose 
community’s interests are being undermined. The result is the need for 
negotiation, bargaining, and compromise among the leaders of the 
different races before their election to Parliament… (Sixth Parliament of 
Singapore 1988: vii) 
Moreover, the GRC system could have been breeding a new type of politicians who 
have broader perspectives and are prepared to work with other politician to form policy 
agenda aimed at promoting encompassing interests. 
                                                                                                 
58 Also see Tan (1999) for a discussion of various aspects of the GRC system, including its weaknesses. 
59 Lee (2000: 210) states that, ‘One advantage of a GRC is that Chinese candidates cannot make Chinese 
chauvinist appeals without losing the 25 to 30 per cent non-Chinese vote. They need a Malay or an 
Indian who can win over the minority votes to be a member of their GRC team of candidates’.   
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4.2  Interpretation of the three reforms  
All three episodes show the importance of the composition of game-playing groups. The 
hybrid groups in these episodes were designed to respect encompassing interests, not 
special or sectoral interests. It may also be true that the group’s very characteristics, 
which induced them to cooperate, also made the regimes of their games endure. 
Note the crucial role of institutional entrepreneurs. In all three cases, productive 
political competition did not emerge as a result of spontaneous cooperation between 
rival groups. There were a handful of individuals—institutional entrepreneurs, so to 
speak—who, from within, persuaded rival groups to agree on new rules of the game. 
Although they were members of one of specific groups, a handful of persons, such as 
Cleisthenes, James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, and Lee Kuan Yew, rose above 
factional interests. James Madison and Thomas Jefferson were members of the Virginia 
delegation to the Constitutional Convention, but it appears that their perspectives were 
more those of the Union than of a region.60 
Note that the introduction of these hybrid political groups did not do away with old 
ethnic or political groups. In Athens and Singapore, old ethnic groups continued and 
continue to exist, but together with new political groups. In the United States, the 
Constitution gave old colonies a new political meaning as electoral districts for the 
US Senate. These political groups have evolved over time to include a mix of ethnic, 
sectoral, and other interest groups.  
Note, however, that these three systems do not necessarily ensure a balanced political 
representation of the ruling party and the opposition party. Under the Cleisthenes 
Constitution, the ten artificial tribes took turns to assume the presidency in each year. 
The US Constitution does not institutionally guarantee a balanced representation of the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party in the US Senate. In Singapore, the GRC 
system has not prevented the sustained dominance of the People’s Action Party. 
The system based on transactions between hybrid groups is effective in restraining 
divisive inter-group conflicts, but may also make it difficult for the interest groups to 
promote their own interests. For example, critics of the GRC system in Singapore argue 
that the system has weakened special-interest groups’ chances to advocate their own 
interests. Thus, a political system should have a balanced mix of both components—one 
aimed at promoting special interests and the other aimed at promoting encompassing 
interests. A bicameral system can be effective in this regard, although an ill-designed 
bicameral system will simply add another layer of political institutions, without solving 
inter-group conflicts. 
4.3 Other  examples 
There are a range of phenomena to which the preceding analytical framework can shed 
light: The two following examples illustrate institutional realigning. 
                                                                                                 
60 As a result of his effort for the cause of the Union, parochially-minded Virginians denied Jefferson his 
cherished dream to become a first US senator from Virginia (see Ellis 2001).  
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Inter-ethnic marriages can lead to a realigning of groups without third-party coercion. 
Over time, inter-group conflicts can diminish. For example, inter-ethnic marriages 
resulting from inter-cultural compatibility have altered Sino-Thai inter-ethnic games in 
Thailand.61 Inter-dynastic marriages could alter the nature of inter-dynastic games. The 
Koryo-Yuan and Yi-Japan inter-dynastic marriages, however, were forced on the Koryo 
and Yi Dynasties, respectively, by Yuan and Japan. It was obvious, however, that they 
were intended by the powerful Yuan and Japanese governments to force changes in the 
nature of the games they played with the Korean dynasties to their advantage. 
In urban-rural conflicts, the composition of rival groups may change through time for a 
number of reasons. These changes tend to alter the nature of the games they play. Rural 
farmers and urban consumers of farm products often play PD games as net producers 
and net consumers of agricultural products, for example, over trade policy. While it is 
not easy to regroup them, migration over time in a collectivist society may change the 
composition of the groups. For example, a massive migration of young people from 
rural to urban areas in Korea during the past decades may have had important 
implications for the way urban and rural residents play urban-rural PD games. Urban 
residents in collectivist Korea have strong family ties to rural residents, and vice versa. 
The two groups resemble gene-sharing siblings. This implies that opening up the 
domestic market for agricultural products is not a simple PD game as in some other 
countries with individualist values. 
The following institutional changes illustrate the issues and are conceivable, but their 
feasibility is not obvious. 
The management of a company normally plays games of bargaining with the labour 
union. In countries with severe labour strife, industrial relations may often be 
characterized more as PD games. When the degree of distrust is high between the 
management and the union with no credible rules that promote cooperation, their games 
can turn into PD games. The players may choose to defect: that it, the union does not 
compromise on wages, and the management responds with a work-stoppage. A third-
party arbitrator can play a useful role,62 but often fails to persuade the two parties to 
compromise. Among other factors, group-oriented values and intra-group cohesion 
intensify this tendency. An institutional redesigning of the two boards—the company’s 
and the union’s—in principle, might increase chances of mutual cooperation.  
For example, a company’s labour union and its management can exchange some of their 
members on their decisionmaking boards. In this case, the role of the board members 
who cross the management-labour line could be limited to those cases in which their 
voting power would help the company avoid mutual defection. This is clearly a 
controversial idea, but, when both the union and management are culturally cohesive 
groups, it might be sensible for the union and the management to use this approach, 
with the help of a third-party, when they know that they both lose because they cannot 
                                                                                                 
61 The author is indebted to Professor Peter Kilby for this point. 
62 Many countries have a tripartite system of governing labour-management relations, with government 
participating as a third-party arbitrator.  
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compromise under the existing rules of the game.63 A potential risk of this approach is 
the possibility of management-labour collusion that endangers the interest of 
stockholders. This approach would be counterproductive when the management is not a 
faithful agent of stockholders. This risk would be reduced, however, if a bicameral 
system of labour-management decisionmaking were introduced, with their pure boards 
and hybrid boards, the former working with their parochial perspectives and the latter 
working with encompassing perspectives. 
Countries are often engaged in trade policy and monetary policy PD games. Changing 
the composition of trade policy boards of the countries that are major trade partners 
might help the two countries avoid a trade war.64 This is a different approach from 
relying on a global organization such as the WTO and could reinforce the role of the 
WTO.  The former tends to keep the international trade games with uncooperative 
games, the latter tries to institute a system of cooperative games. 
Political competition in Korea has shown features of classic PD games.65 Political 
parties have had strong regional roots. In general, members of the National Assembly 
(NA) tend to represent strong regional or sectoral interests. Leading politicians have 
been making unsuccessful efforts to broaden their parties’ membership beyond their 
regions. A number of ideas have been under consideration. One of them is to increase 
the size of electoral districts and allowing two or more representatives to be elected in 
one district. The reasoning is that this system would ensure a more balanced regional 
representation in major political parties. While this is true, this may or may not reduce 
regional political conflicts, as explained below on the basis of a simple example: 
Suppose there are two regionally-oriented political parties X and Y and two regions RX 
and RY that elect NA members.  
i)  Under a system of small single-member electoral districts, voters with strong 
regional ties in RX will elect only the candidates from X; those in RY only 
those from Y. 
ii)  Under a system of large multiple-member electoral districts, there is a chance, 
albeit no certainty, that candidates from both parties will be elected in each. 
Even if the candidates of both X and Y were elected from RX, however, it is 
unclear how the members of Y elected in RX would act on legislative matters 
of  special importance for RX. On matters of special regional importance, 
voluntary coalitions are likely to form at the NA along regional lines and 
across party lines. The representatives would have split loyalty—to their 
region and to their party. In a strongly group-oriented society where regional 
ties matter, loyalty to their region may matter more than loyalty to their 
                                                                                                 
63 This arrangement will succeed only if it the management is the true representative of the shareholders. 
Otherwise, the arrangement could yield a management-labour collusion that works against the interest 
of shareholders.  
64 In a slightly different context, with regard to monetary policy, there has been a suggestion that the US 
Open Market Committee (OMC) may include foreign central bank officials. This idea is based on the 
recognition that US monetary policy has far-reaching implications for the global economy and that a 
redesigned OMC would be guided by broader interests, rather than by purely US interests 
65 While using a Korean case, the discussion here may be adapted to many political problems in 
collectivist societies.  
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respective parties unless either (1) charismatic heads rule the parties with iron 
fists or (2) the parties have a set of rules that would transform the diverse 
special interests within them into policy agenda aimed at promoting 
encompassing interests. These requirements, the former in particular, are not 
conducive to the development of democratic institutions, including a system of 
political parties that make their decisions democratically, not through central 
command, and that promote the expression of diverse individual views of NA 
members. 
iii)  There can be, however, other ways to redesign political groups. For example, 
in the tradition of the Cleisthenes Constitution, a new system may form inter-
regional electoral districts by merging electoral districts in RX and RY. In this 
case, each electoral district would include some voters from both RX and RY. 
If political competition is vigorous and if election is fair, the representatives of 
such districts would become political siblings and would tend to seek 
cooperation in inter-regional political PD games they play in the National 
Assembly. This system would tend to make it difficult, if not impossible, for 
regional coalitions to form on key regionally-divided issues. 
5 Broader  issues 
Without effective rules, collectivist societies need charismatic, benevolent, and 
authoritarian leaders to coordinate the interests of fierce rival groups. Without such 
leaders, a collectivist society can be fractured, as rival groups keep choosing defection, 
thus failing to attain the societies’ potential gains from cooperation. This is a problem 
facing collectivist societies trying to establish democratic institutions that rely more on 
rules and less on such charismatic leaders. This paper has argued that instituting new 
political groups (e.g., political siblings) would reduce their need to rely either on such 
leaders or on effective third-party rules to avoid defection traps. This section discusses a 
number of issues that would put the model in a broader and dynamic context. In 
particular, this section comments on why forming hybrid groups may be feasible. 
5.1  Learning to cooperate? 
So far, this paper has assumed that λ is exogenous, noting that λ changes only slowly. 
The analysis, therefore, has been static. Developing a dynamic model by endogenizing λ 
would require a broader framework than introduced in this paper. While this section 
later discusses the preceding analysis in the context of longer-term game models, it 
begins by considering possibilities for λ to change. 
An analysis of how λ may change can highlight the severe difficulties collectivist 
societies face in achieving inter-group cooperation in a realistic timespan. To see this, 
one can ask: Can there be an approach for rival groups with collectivist values to 
achieving voluntary cooperation through learning? To see how difficult this road is, 
consider a large number of pairs of rival groups playing one-off games with different 
material payoffs. Assume the following: (i) Different pairs of groups have different 
degrees of conflicts (i.e., different values of λj). (ii) The material payoffs are symmetric, 
but different games have different degrees of potential gains (xj = 2aj – 2dj, j = 1, 2, …, J, 
with xj > 0) when they switch from mutual defection to mutual cooperation. The games 
played between rival groups (with λj > 1) may be grouped as follows:  
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a)  Consider games with a material payoff structure (i.e., non-PD games) the 
standard solution of which is mutual cooperation. Between collectivist groups, 
with λj > 1, these games would be played in two ways: 
a(i) games  with  cooperation  as  actual outcome: the value of λj is not large 
enough, and the groups attain 2aj. 
a(ii) games with mutual defection as actual outcome: the value of λj is large 
enough, and these groups know that they could gain 2aj, but attain only 
2dj. 
b)  Consider PD games that yield defection. Game-playing groups gain only 2dj, 
regardless of the value of λj as far as it is not less than 1—the case that is ruled 
out because the groups are collectivist. 
A tabular list of these cases may be as follows:66 
      Actual outcomes based on 
perceived payoffs 
Games with material payoffs (i.e., before transformation) 
for which the dominant strategy in the standard solution is 
 
 cooperation  a(i)   λj >1, but small  Cooperation 
   a(ii)   λj >1 and large  Defection 
 defection  b  Defection 
 
If the rival groups with collectivist values learn by watching how other rival groups 
realize the potential gains through cooperation, those who play the games in case a(ii) 
might learn, over time, to emulate the groups playing the games in case a(i). They 
would learn that these players attain the potential gains (xj) because their λj’s are low, 
while they do not. Over time, they might learn to reduce the value of λj’s with which 
they transform the material payoffs. Thus, an increasing number of the games in case (a) 
would yield mutual cooperation. 
Are these conditions for mutual cooperation easy to fulfil in a world of inter-group 
conflicts? The answer is no. It is unclear to what extent the players in category a(ii) will 
emulate those in group a(i) in a realistically short timespan. This does not seem to be a 
matter of knowledge or intelligence, but a matter of culture and values. Even if the 
players were capable of learning, the evolutionary process described above would be 
very slow.67  
Moreover, the process would lead the players in category (b) to mutual cooperation only 
if λj were reduced to less than 1. For λj to be reduced to below 1 implies that the game-
playing groups stop being culturally collectivist. History suggests that this is a realistic 
                                                                                                 
66 In this list, λj’s for all groups are greater than 1. Any groups that use a λj less than 1 are considered a 
group. This simplification helps makes the essential point in this paper. 
67 Evolutionary game models have considered possibilities for an increasing number of players to learn 
from ‘cooperators’ to choose cooperation in PD games. This process requires even a longer timespan.  
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prospect only for an extremely long timespan. Poor countries are poor to a considerable 
extend because they cannot agree on rules that would promote mutual cooperation. 
5.2  Inter-group conflicts, power distance, and cooperation 
The preceding analysis has shown that, in theory, collectivist societies could promote 
inter-group cooperation via two approaches, (i) forming hybrid groups and (ii) repeating 
to play the game. With a relatively high α, a low i would promote cooperation between 
the two groups, XN and YN. A low α would induce them to cooperate with a relatively 
high i. A sufficiently low α would induce them to cooperate regardless of the level of i. 
As mentioned, having a low i is a difficult condition to satisfy in a collectivist society, 
which tends to have weak rules and, thus, in which groups tend to discount heavily 
future payoffs.  
The limited promise of the repetition of game, a large λ (exceeding 1), and a high i leave 
forming hybrid groups as one of the few realistically feasible roads to cooperation in a 
society with collectivist values and inter-group conflicts. Forming hybrid groups is not 
the same as making the rival groups care about each other. The outcome from forming 
hybrid groups is not predicated on changes in the degree of inter-group conflicts (λ), 
which reflects cultural values of the members of X and Y. With a sufficiently low α, 
cooperation would emerge between XN and YN.  
It is, however, important for the two rival groups to agree to form hybrid groups. They 
might not agree if they were severely antagonistic. Moreover, hybrid groups must have 
proper internal decision rules. The representatives should play the game in accordance 
with the rules described in the preceding discussion. The outcome would not be 
cooperation under, for example, either a despotic tyranny allied only with the majority 
or a majoritarian tyranny in the name of democracy. 
How would a society meet this challenge? The following part of this section introduces 
a broad framework that may be used to discuss how a society might respond to 
destructive inter-group conflicts. To this end, it is necessary to continue the discussion 
on the basis of more than two game-playing groups, which play a range of games with 
different material payoff structures. A simple representation of this situation can 
highlight a few essential points as follows: 
Some of the games are games with a non-PD structure of their material payoffs (cases 
a(i) and a(ii)) in the preceding subsection, but the others are games with a PD structure 
of their material payoffs and, thus, with mutual defection as their solution (case b). 
While the cases in a(i) (with relatively small λ’s, but still in excess of 1), on the basis of 
perceived payoffs, yield mutual cooperation, the rest (cases in a(ii)) (with large λ’s, in 
excess of 1 by a large margin), on the basis of perceived payoffs, yield mutual defection. 
There is no third-party coordination. Severe inter-group conflicts (a large λj) imply that 
the category (b) games and a large number of games in the category (a) yield mutual 
defection. This, in turn, means large aggregate unattained net potential gains, since a 
large share of games will have mutual defection as solution. 
In a situation like this, it is not unreasonable to postulate that (i) as a society has severe 
inter-group conflicts (a large λj) and (ii) as games with large potential payoffs (2cj–2dj) 
are PD games, the rival groups’ demand for third-party rules will be large, unless one of  
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the groups can dominate the other(s). The rival groups will recognize the need for 
binding rules, but conflicts and mutual mistrust will not allow them to agree on, or 
enforce, such rules. The essential function of such rules is to induce or even to force the 
players away from mutual defection toward mutual cooperation. 
Up to this point, taking a rather unusual approach that characterizes social processes as 
strategic games between various groups, this paper has explored how the demand for 
third-party rules might arise. The discussion has highlighted two elements: potential 
gains from cooperation and inter-group conflicts arising from collectivist values. 
How the society responds to this demand is more difficult to postulate. There may be a 
range of possibilities between the following two extreme cases: 
a)  A society might not be able to provide any coherent rules. This would be 
anarchy. While an evolutionary process toward uncoordinated cooperation is 
conceivable, any institutional reform for mutual cooperation would be limited 
even in the long run. 
b)  A society might respond by producing a coherent, effective authority, which 
can establish effective rules that ensure cooperation. 
History shows that societies have responded to the demand for an effective rule in a 
variety of ways. It appears that at least two factors mattered. One is whether a society 
had individualist or collectivist values. Individualist societies have established a rule of 
law.68 Collectivist societies have not been as successful in establishing such a rule. The 
other is whether a society was uni-polar or multi-polar in its initial power structure. 
Societies with a multi-polar power structure and political competition have developed a 
democratic rule. Societies with a uni-polar power structure in which power was 
monopolized have developed an authoritarian rule.69  These societies have tended to 
have a large power distance. A large power distance, however, does not necessarily 
imply a despotic rule. Confucianism has tended to idealize a paternalistic, benevolent 
rule, although its ideals, relying excessively on refined leaders rather than on effective 
rules, do not necessarily always materialize in practice. 
5.3  Would forming hybrid groups be politically feasible? 
The analysis in this paper has shown that, once established, hybrid groups can achieve 
cooperation that rival groups cannot achieve in a collectivist society. This conclusion 
leads to two important questions: (i) Can societies establish such a system? (ii) If it is 
feasible, why do they institute such a system, but not a system in which rival groups, not 
hybrid groups, are induced or forced to cooperate?  
The remaining part of this section answers these questions in reversed order. This 
subsection compares the feasibility of two institutional changes aimed at promoting 
cooperation: (i) imposing a system of rewards or punishments for two rival groups to 
choose cooperation rather than defection and (ii) forming hybrid groups that by design 
                                                                                                 
68 This ideal is well captured in Madison’s Federalist Paper No. 9 quoted earlier in this paper. 
69 Olson (1965) and Moore (1966) seem to agree on this point.  
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have incentives in themselves to choose cooperation. The following subsection 
discusses the crucial role of institutional entrepreneurs as catalysts in forming hybrid 
groups and interprets their significance in a framework of evolutionary game models. 
The central point in this regard is that the rival groups are aware of the potential gains 
(x =2a-2d) they can collectively obtain by moving from defection to cooperation. This 
powerful incentive exists in both categories of (a(ii)) and (b), which yield defection, in 
the preceding subsection. The groups, however, cannot achieve this change because 
there is no effective coordination. The following analysis assumes that the members of 
the two groups together comprise the population of a whole country (e.g., a country 
divided by two ethnic groups).70 
Consider rewards and punishments. Any rewards aimed at inducing the groups to 
cooperate should be powerful enough to raise the payoff for each of the two groups to a 
level above c in the payoff Matrix (1). This means that, relative to the status quo, 
collective net gains a system of rewards offers would have to be larger than 2a-2d, 
which is the maximum extent of the gains to be achieved by a movement from mutual 
defection to mutual cooperation. In the case of two competing political groups in a 
country, such a system of rewards would not be financially feasible for a third party to 
promise.71  
The only financially viable incentives, therefore, would be negative incentives. The 
groups could be threatened to be taxed for their defection. In principle, the groups could 
be forced to cooperation if a credible punishment (or taxation) scheme turns cooperation 
into the dominant strategy on the basis of after-punishment (or after-tax) payoffs. In a 
typical collectivist society, however, punishment, taxation, and other rules, are not 
credible, and the enforcer implements them with a large degree of discretion. The 
groups, therefore, are unlikely to choose cooperation under such a punishment rule. 
Moreover, an ineffective punishment scheme, while not effective enough to induce 
them to cooperate, might still cause the groups to feel threatened for possible 
punishment for choosing defection. Therefore, instituting a system of punishments is 
unlikely to be politically viable, compared with the status quo. 
There still is a way. It is for a tyrant, as a third party with a large stick, to force the 
groups to cooperate. Such a third-party rule, however, has been accompanied by a 
sharing of the realized net gains between the game-playing groups and the rule 
enforcer.72  
Forming hybrid groups would meet different obstacles, but can be shown to be more 
viable. A clear indication of its viability is that, as earlier shown, three societies (ancient 
Greece, colonial America, and Singapore) have successfully instituted the system, and, 
as shown below, they have not been historical accidents. Moreover, under the 
conditions (e.g., reasonably fair, transparent elections) discussed in section 3, in no 
conceivable circumstances would the members of the rival groups be worse off (or 
                                                                                                 
70 The argument also holds for many parts of these two groups playing inter-group games. 
71 The incentive system would imply promising the material payoffs beyond the confinement of the 
feasible payoff sets. 
72 On the basis of a different model, research has explored how a despot might go further to tax away 
parts of these gains (McGuire and Olson 1996; Olson 2000; Mueller 2003).  
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threatened to be worse off) with the system of hybrid groups than with the status quo. 
Unlike in the case of a system of punishments above, there is no risk they would have to 
consider in this case. There are circumstances in which the system of hybrid groups 
would not bring about the promised net gains. For example, the elected 
representatives—members of the dominant groups in their respective electoral 
districts—might still choose to defect. Even in this worst-case scenario, the members of 
the hybrid groups would not be worse off than in the status quo.73 
Establishing a system of hybrid political groups implies a potential Paretian 
improvement, but does not pose any risk for the members of the groups. What is also 
attractive about this system is that the society already has a system of how the gains 
would be distributed among members of rival groups.74 While not easy, particularly 
when rival groups are severely antagonistic, the conditions for this change do not seem 
insurmountable in many modern societies with collectivist values. 
The essential difficulties associated with trying to achieve cooperation between rival 
groups without forming hybrid groups arise from their reliance on an effective third-
party rule, which is a difficult condition to fulfil in a collectivist society. By comparison, 
forming hybrid groups relies minimally on a third-party rule. If a third-party rule were 
comparable to trying to establish conditions for rival groups to play cooperative games, 
forming hybrid groups would be creating realistic conditions for rival groups to achieve 
cooperation in noncooperative games by mimicking the manner in which biological 
siblings achieve cooperation in their games. The former is more difficult to achieve than 
the latter in general and in collectivist societies in particular. 
Possible resistance to forming hybrid groups, however, might come not from members 
of rival groups, but from their leaders whose positions might be weakened in the new 
rule. In an authoritarian society, in which the leaders of rival groups have authority, the 
transition to a system of hybrid groups would not take place spontaneously. A new 
breed of leaders, or institutional entrepreneurs, should emerge. 
5.4  Forming hybrid groups—the rise of institutional entrepreneurs as catalysts 
Thus, forming hybrid groups can be considered a least-resistance path to a Paretian 
improvement. Political hybrid groups, however, did not emerge without the role of 
institutional entrepreneurs. How can one explain the rise of institutional entrepreneurs—
the Cleistheneses, the Madisons, and the Lees? Evolutionary game theory suggests a 
broad framework. A brief sketch of an evolutionary framework may be as follows. 
Game theory, on the basis of theoretical models and through experiments, has shown 
that in repeated PD game situations, it is plausible for at least some human beings to 
practice strong reciprocity—‘a propensity to cooperate and share with others similarly 
disposed, even at personal costs, and a willingness to punish those who violate 
cooperative and other social norms, even when punishing is personally costly, and even 
                                                                                                 
73 Note that the games are played between AN and BN, but the payoffs accrue to A and B, which have a 
well-established mechanism to distribute the payoffs. 
74 An example would be a change in economic policy that yields collective gains for the residents in two 
rival regions.   
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when there are no plausible future rewards or benefits from so behaving’ (Gintis 
2000:  255). Thus, through an evolutionary process, human beings can develop 
institutions for cooperation. 
This evolutionary process takes a long time. Evolutionary game models characterize this 
process as a learning process of groups of humans (e.g., strong reciprocators or the 
homo reciprocans) responding to opportunities by multiplying at a higher rate over time 
than others (e.g., the homo economicus). The timespan in these models is scores of 
thousands of years. This is an excessively long timespan to discuss institutional reforms. 
Moreover, the homo reciprocans in evolutionary game models are faceless. In a shorter 
timespan, two armies cannot wage battles without heroes. To interpret history or to 
derive lessons from history for improving or reforming institutions, one must be able to 
explain what happens during a much shorter timespan and to formulate a framework to 
allow the role of generals (or catalysts) on the battlefronts. In the forming of political 
hybrid groups, the catalysts were institutional entrepreneurs—the heroes or generals 
who played the role of early homo reciprocans. 
To this end, it is helpful to note a wide range of cognitive and other human 
capabilities.75  In inter-group PD games, some humans become strong reciprocators 
much earlier than others. Some societies have had such early strong reciprocators, while 
other not.76 Athens, colonial America, and Singapore produced Cleisthenes, Madison, 
and Lee, but many others did not. A long process of human learning can be described as 
a process in which a limited number of early strong reciprocators (i.e., the early homo 
reciprocans) lead and the others follow. The rise of such early strong reciprocators is in 
line with the predictions of evolutionary game-theoretic models. Institutional 
entrepreneurs may be characterized as such early reciprocators, who recognize an 
opportunity (and are ready to act) for the society to gain by moving from D-D to C-C.  
The emergence of hybrid groups may have been an outcome of both demand-side 
conditions (i.e., opportunities for Paretian improvements) and supply-side conditions 
(i.e., the availability and specific traits of institutional entrepreneurs), as well as the 
political and socioeconomic environment (including those factors earlier discussed in 
section 5.2) in which these early reciprocators catalyzed the forming of the hybrid 
groups. These early strong reciprocators could consider different routes to this goal—
establishing third-party rules prohibiting defections, creating a system of incentives and 
punishments, and creating hybrid groups. As discussed earlier in this section, 
establishing hybrid groups could obviously be a least-resistance path. The early strong 
reciprocators would also have different means, including use of force and persuasion, in 
achieve the goal. The specific personal traits of these early strong reciprocators were 
conditioned by genetic and cultural factors. The political and socioeconomic conditions 
offered alternative paths for these leaders with different traits.  
                                                                                                 
75 In formulating a framework in which institutional reforms are constrained by the limited supply of 
institutional entrepreneurs, the author would like to acknowledge his indebtedness to Peter Kilby, who 
has pointed out that technological innovation is constrained by the limited supply of Schumpeterian 
entrepreneurs (see Kilby 2003, 1971).  
76 Even in a more mundane situation, one sees the emergence of such a person in some case, and not in 
other cases. For example, a crowd might create a chaos by trying to go through a small gate to a 
stadium for a free concert. In some cases, only in some cases, a couple of persons, at the costs of their 
personal discomfort, rise to the occasion and keep the order.   
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5.5  Would the hybrid political groups be too artificial to be sustained? 
The proposed hybrid political groups would be artificial groups, but so are geographical 
areas as electoral districts with diverse ethnic groups. When two geographical regions 
are in conflict, forming political groups that draw their members from geographically 
noncontiguous regions would not offer causes for violent clashes between the groups at 
a district level. The candidates would campaign by travelling between noncontiguous 
sub-districts. If the number of geographical areas in one hybrid electoral district is 
relatively small, having a parliamentary member to represent an electoral district 
comprising a number of noncontiguous geographical regions would not be a problem 
with current communication and transportation technology. It is true, however, that 
there would be a threshold of inter-group rivalry beyond which the proposed system of 
political competition would not be feasible.  
5.6  Feasibility of broader cohesion in a collectivist society? 
The model in this paper analytically supports the findings of the research in cross-
cultural psychology suggesting that a typical collectivist society tends to be more 
fractious than a typical individualist society. Collectivist values tend to make group 
members perceive non-PD games as PD games. 
These findings are not necessarily in conflict with remarkable national cohesion found 
in certain circumstances in a collectivist society. A common external threat would 
create different opportunities for rival groups in a collectivist society. The opportunities 
would include possibilities for coalitions, including one with the outside force. When 
the threat poses a choice for the rival groups—a choice between a certain foreign 
domination and a chance for them to avoid the domination via inter-group coalition, 
their payoff structure would change, and rival groups would be able to achieve inter-
group cohesion. 
6  Summary and conclusions 
Cultural collectivism can promote social cohesion, but is often a source of inter-group 
collisions, which are politically, economically, and socially destabilizing. It is an 
important factor underlying institutional inefficiencies that deny collectivist societies 
the achievement of their full economic potential in the short run and in the longer run. 
Institutional reform can help these countries achieve these potential gains by promoting 
productive interaction between rival groups. 
A secure road for rival game-playing groups to achieve mutual cooperation is for the 
groups to pay attention to the interests of their rivals (i.e., by moving toward observing 
the Golden Rule). This is how gene-sharing siblings succeed to cooperate and how 
collectivist groups achieve intra-group cooperation. This is also what rival groups fail to 
achieve by the nature of their relationship. 
This paper suggests that inter-group cooperation is difficult to achieve, particularly in 
societies with group-oriented values and severe inter-group conflicts. Reforming the 
nature of rival groups in a collectivist society to care about the opponents’ interests is as 
difficult as reforming human beings to be altruistic. Mutual cooperation through the  
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repeated playing of a game is not an easy condition to fulfil for rival groups to achieve 
in a culturally collectivist society. Rival groups may not choose to repeat a game, even 
if they are forced to, and a high discount rate and the inter-group antagonism reduce 
chances for mutual cooperation. This explains the failure of many collectivist societies 
to establish effective rules for political and economic cooperation. 
Rival groups, however, can begin to cooperate by forming hybrid groups, which 
become the political equivalents of gene-sharing siblings. Institutionally engineering 
hybrid political groups that resemble gene-sharing siblings is not easy, but may be 
easier to achieve than either reforming the cultural characteristics of rival groups or 
establishing an effective third-party rule for cooperation between rival groups. 
For mutual cooperation to emerge, these hybrid groups must have an exact set of 
features. Each group should have a mix of the members of both rival groups. These 
mixed groups, not their subgroups or members, should be the game players. For 
example, (i) when ethnic groups are engaged in playing PD games, hybrid groups 
should be mixed ethnic groups; (ii) when rival groups playing PD games are the 
residents of rival regions (e.g., urban and rural regions), hybrid groups to play political 
games should have a balanced representation of the residents of rival regions. 
They also should have proper internal decision rules to transform members’ preferences 
to group preferences. All this condition requires, however, is for each group to have a 
representative and to hold fair elections to choose the representative. Indirect democracy 
is crucial. Each hybrid group should be represented by an individual, not by a group of 
individuals, unless the group is designed to vote as a team. Hybrid groups and indirect 
democracy requiring an individual to represent a hybrid group prevent the formation of 
special-interest coalitions. This is a condition that is not impossible to fulfil in many, 
although not all, collectivist countries in the present circumstances. 
The following discussions further illustrate how hybrid political groups work: 
a)  Suppose the members of the US House and the US Senate from New York and 
Iowa are engaged in a political PD game over a critical issue that sharply 
divides rural and urban residents. New York is a relatively urban state, while 
Iowa is a relatively rural state. Both states, which are the electoral districts for 
their senators, however, have both urban and rural electoral districts for their 
members of the House. If the issue was truly important, the members of the 
House are likely to be divided along rural-urban lines. They would tend to 
defect in urban-rural PD games. The senators, however, who represent the 
whole states, which include both urban and rural areas, would have to consider 
the interests of both urban and rural residents in New York and Iowa. There 
are greater chances for the senators to choose cooperation in urban-rural PD 
games. 
b)  The candidate groups, including ethnic Chinese, Indians, and Malays, in GRC 
districts in Singapore run as teams. Their campaign promises would be 
different from those that would emerge from ethnically-oriented individual 
Chinese, Indian, and Malay candidates who would run, respectively, in 
separate ethnic Chinese, Indian, and Malay districts. Candidates running in 
hybrid electoral districts would have incentives to promote encompassing 
interests, in comparison with ethnic candidates running, respectively, in their  
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own ethnic districts. Hybrid candidate groups competing in GRC districts 
would have greater incentives to cooperate with each other on divisive ethnic 
issues. 
Historically, the Cleisthenes Constitution, the US Constitution, and the Singaporean 
Group Representation System have achieved to form sibling-like political groups out of 
squabbling tribal, regional, and ethnic groups. But such rules do not appear to have 
emerged spontaneously. In each historical episode of the emergence of political hybrid 
groups, institutional entrepreneurs played key roles.  
Hybrid groups, of course, are not an answer to all institutional problems. The 
institutional engineering of political siblings is a specific reform aimed at enhancing 
cooperation. They may not work in certain circumstances; they may not achieve any 
objectives. The tendency for hybrid groups to pay attention to encompassing interests 
may imply an inadequate attention to special needs of specific groups. Hybrid groups 
would not solve this problem. Therefore, transactions among proposed hybrid groups 
should be an additional layer of political transactions. This is clearly the case of the 
US Senate. The bicameral system offers checks and balances between the promotion of 
relatively narrow interests for smaller electoral districts and broader interests for larger 
ones. 
When two regionally-based rival political parties are engaged in playing PD games, it is 
not sufficient for these two parties to broaden their membership if individual party 
members have incentives to promote their own regional interests. The results may be 
fractured parties that have divisive regional subgroups in each of them. In this case, 
forming hybrid political groups and institutionalizing indirect representation may help a 
society get out of defection traps in political PD games. The hybrid groups, by political 
construction, would seek encompassing interests. These artificial coalitions, which 
cannot be formed voluntarily in a collectivist society, prevent the emergence of special-
interest coalitions. 
The three historical episodes suggest both optimistic and pessimistic outlooks. On the 
optimistic side, they suggest that it is possible for a society to promote cooperation by 
forming hybrid political groups. Clearly, engineering political siblings is feasible; 
changing human values, such as collectivism, may take centuries or even longer. The 
formation of hybrid groups is in line with the manner in which evolutionary game 
models explain how human society has evolved toward cooperation. Societies that try to 
establish these groups would not be swimming against the evolutionary tide.  
The paper also has noted that forming hybrid groups may be viewed as a least-resistance 
path to cooperation. It is like establishing a ground for noncooperative games that yield 
cooperation with little effective third-party coordination—that is, without achieving 
sufficient conditions for cooperative games. 
On the pessimistic side, however, it is unclear exactly how  collectivist societies, in 
general, can emulate the successful episodes of ancient Athens, colonial America, and 
Singapore. It is clear that their successes benefited from the role of a number of 
individuals. Analogy between Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs and institutional 
entrepreneurs is instructive. As Schumpeter’s entrepreneurs introduce new technology 
that raises firms’ and a society’s productivity, institutional entrepreneurs introduce new 
institutions and raise a society’s overall productivity. As the former assemble talented  
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people and capital to use new technology to produce new products, the latter persuade 
stakeholders to institute new rules for more productive political, economic, and social 
interactions. 
The paper has highlighted that institutionally engineered political siblings have tamed 
factionalism and that they have done so not accidentally. This is a notable lesson for the 
designers of political institutions. The paper, however, has not fully addressed the 
question of how they, but not others, have succeeded, although the supply of 
institutional entrepreneurs seems to matter. Under what conditions can other societies 
emulate their experiences? More broadly, what are the roles of institutional engineers 
and other stakeholders? What are the role of ideas and vested interests? These are 
questions for further studies. 
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